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Note
Burned Out: The Supreme Court Strikes Down
Virginia's Cross Burning Statute in Virginia v. Black
By Amanda J. Congdon*
I. INTRODUCTION
Liza Costa and her family moved to Rushville, Missouri in 1997.'
Believing that Ms. Costa and her children were African American, three
men schemed to burn a cross in the Costas' lawn to frighten the family
into leaving town.2 They welded metal pipe into the shape of a cross
and wrapped the cross in towels.3 The men then met at the volunteer
fire station in town and took turns dousing the cross with gasoline.4
There were approximately twenty other people gathered at the fire
station to advocate their notions of white supremacy and to discuss the
three men's intent to burn the cross in the Costas' yard. 5 Two of the
men threw rocks and beer cans at those in the crowd who were
unwilling to participate in the cross burning directed at the Costa
family.6
Two of the original planners and one minor left the meeting to bum
the cross. 7  One man, wearing a .22 caliber revolver in a shoulder
* J.D. expected May 2005. To my family, particularly my mother, I thank you for your
infinite amount of support and love. I would also like to thank Chad for his constant
encouragement and guidance. To my friends, thank you for your tolerance while I devoted most
of my time to this project. Finally, I owe the most gratitude to the editors and members of the
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal for their extensive assistance in getting this Note just
right.
1. United States v. Pospisil, 186 F.3d 1023, 1027 (8th Cir. 1999).
2. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that the Costas are not
African American but rather are of Cape Verdean ancestry, which is closer to Portuguese lineage
than to African. Id. at 1027 n.3.
3. Id. at 1027.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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holster, planted the cross in the Costas' front lawn and lit it afire while
another slashed the tires of the Costas' car.8 The men then circled the
family's home in their car and one of the three fired several shots as
they drove away.9 These men were convicted under a federal statute for
conspiring to violate the Costas' civil rights. 10
When the Commonwealth of Virginia enacted its cross burning
statute, it intended to protect its citizens against the intimidation that
results from cross burning like that directed at the Costa family."' The
Virginia Code prohibits an individual from burning a cross with the
intent to intimidate. 12 The statute also includes an evidentiary provision
stating that "[a]ny such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence
of an intent to intimidate a person or a group of persons."' 3 This prima
facie provision meant that a jury would be able to infer intimidation
from the act of cross burning itself.14
Over eighty years ago, in his dissenting opinion in Gilbert v.
Minnesota, United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis noted
that an individual's freedom of speech is more important to the United
States than it is to that individual, thereby declaring the fundamental
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.; see infra note 192 (describing the federal government's efforts at prosecuting cross
burning as a violation of civil rights). Missouri did not have a cross burning statute at the time
this case was decided but now has a proposed regulation pending. See infra note 489 and
accompanying text (discussing Missouri's proposed state bill to prohibit cross burning with the
intent to intimidate).
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1996).
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any
person or group of persons, to bum, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of
another, a highway or other public place. Any person who shall violate any provision
of this section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.
Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate
a person or group of persons.
Id.; see also Black v. Virginia, 553 S.E.2d 738, 742 n.3 (Va. 2001) (citing to several articles to
emphasize the frequency with which cross burnings occurred prior to the enactment of the
Virginia statute).
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423.
13. Id.
14. See infra notes 241-46 (explaining how the trial judge instructed the jury as to the
application of the prima facie evidence provision in Black's and Elliott's cases). Virginia
convicted Barry Black under section 18.2-423 for setting a cross afire at a Ku Klux Klan rally.
Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1542 (2003). Virginia convicted Richard Elliott under the
same statute for setting a cross on fire in his neighbor's yard. Id. at 1543. Prima facie evidence is
"evidence that will establish a fact or sustain a judgment unless contradictory evidence is
produced." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 579 (7th ed. 1999).
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nature of the protected right. 15 In his concurring opinion in Whitney v.
California, Justice Brandeis acknowledged that unless the speech in
question provokes imminent harm or threatens serious injury to the
government, the state has alternative means by which it can deter crime
that do not involve restricting individual rights to free speech and
expression. 16  The Supreme Court has struggled to define the
boundaries of First Amendment protections for many years. 17 Through
this struggle, the Court has determined that there is a difference between
using freedom of expression to intimidate and using freedom of
expression as a protected right under the First Amendment. 18
Questions regarding whether the Virginia cross burning statute
violated the First Amendment arose after the Commonwealth of
Virginia held that Barry Black violated Virginia Code section 18.2-423
when he burned a cross on private property as a part of a Ku Klux Klan
("Klan") rally to express the group's ideals and opposition to
minorities. 19 Richard Elliott and Jonathan O'Mara were convicted
under this statute when they burned a cross in Elliott's neighbor's yard,
allegedly in retaliation for his complaints about Elliott's shooting in
Elliott's backyard. 20  The state court of appeals later affirmed Black's,
Elliott's, and O'Mara's convictions. 21  Each man appealed to the
15. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 338 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (writing that an
individual's exercise of free speech is "more important to the Nation than it is to himself"); see
also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (stating, to
emphasize how the constitutional principle should exist in fact, that "[fireedom of expression
would not truly exist if the right could be exercised only in an area that a benevolent government
has provided as a safe haven for crackpots").
16. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating that
education should be a deterrent to prevent crime rather than a diminution of the freedom of
speech), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969). Justice Brandeis said that
proper deterrents to crime should be "education and punishment for violations of the law, not
abridgement of the rights of free speech and assembly." Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring); see David
M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1207,
1338 (1983) (discussing Justice Brandeis' impact on First Amendment analysis). Professor
Rabban wrote, "The result, the analytical and rhetorical brilliance of his first amendment opinions
in the 1920's, has never been equaled, and Whitney, his most developed opinion, defies
paraphrase." Id.
17. See infra Part II.C (discussing the evolution of First Amendment jurisprudence with
regard to the freedom of expression).
18. See infra Parts II.D.2-3 (discussing true threats and the fighting words doctrine as
differentiating between protected and prohibited speech). For example, true threats are not
considered protected under the First Amendment as freedom of expression. See infra Part II.D.2
(discussing the true threats doctrine as the United States Supreme Court used it in Watts v. United
States).
19. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1542.
20. Id. at 1543.
21. Id.
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Supreme Court of Virginia, contending that the statute was facially
unconstitutional. 22 Namely, they asserted that the prima facie evidence
provision of the Virginia statute violated the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution.23 The Supreme Court of Virginia held the
statute to be facially unconstitutional, basing its reasoning on the United
States Supreme Court's holding in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul.24 Virginia
appealed the Virginia Supreme Court's decision to the United States
Supreme Court, and thus the United States Supreme Court faced the
issue of whether Virginia's cross burning statute was constitutional.25
Ultimately, in a 6-3 decision, the United States Supreme Court held
that the Virginia prima facie evidence provision violated the First
Amendment of the Constitution because it chilled speech.26
Nevertheless, the Court stated that a statute that makes illegal cross
burning with the intent to intimidate was within constitutional
boundaries, so long as the statute did not include a similar prima facie
evidence provision.27  Therefore, although the Court struck down
Virginia's statute, the Court did not prohibit all cross burning statutes.
28
Before this Note examines Virginia v. Black, Part II first will discuss
the history of First Amendment jurisprudence. 29  Part II then will
consider the rationale behind First Amendment protections and several
doctrines that the Court has used to analyze challenges on First
Amendment grounds. 30  Finally, Part II will look at symbolic speech
and the issues that cross burning has created within the First
Amendment context.3 1
Part III then will examine Virginia's trial, appellate, and supreme
court opinions32 along with the United States Supreme Court opinions
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1548. Black, Elliott, and O'Mara, the respondents, argued that the prima facie
evidence provision was facially unconstitutional. Id. at 1550.
24. Id. See generally infra Part II.H (discussing the holding in RA.V. v. City of St. Paul and
other cross burning cases).
25. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1541.
26. Id.; see supra note 14 (defining prima facie evidence).
27. See infra note 292 and accompanying text (explaining how the Court held in Virginia v.
Black that a prohibition on cross burning with intent to intimidate is constitutional).
28. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1541.
29. See infra Part II.A (reviewing the history of the First Amendment).
30. See infra Part II.B-C (detailing the Court's different analytical approaches to the First
Amendment).
31. See infra Part II.D-G (discussing cases leading up to Virginia v. Black that serve as
examples of the Court's analysis of symbolic speech and types of conduct that may be protected
under the First Amendment).
32. See infra Part 1ILA-C (examining Black's history in the lower courts before it reached the
United States Supreme Court).
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of Virginia v. Black.33  Part IV will analyze the Virginia v. Black
decision and argue that while the Court correctly concluded that a state
may ban cross burning with intent to intimidate, the Court erroneously
declared the statute facially unconstitutional based on its prima facie
evidence provision. 34 Next, Part V will discuss both the impact that this
case will have on First Amendment jurisprudence and the public's
perception and reaction to the decision. 35  This Note will conclude by
predicting that a similar case someday will come before the Supreme
Court because the Court left several questions unanswered in Virginia v.
Black.36
II. BACKGROUND
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances." 37 The First Amendment generally prevents the
government from proscribing speech or expressive content simply
because the government does not approve of the message conveyed.38
However, the First Amendment does not provide absolute protection for
every utterance and action. 39  Accordingly, this Part describes the
33. See infra Part III.D.1-3 (detailing the plurality opinion along with the separate concurring
and dissenting opinions).
34. See infra Part IV (questioning the analysis adopted by the plurality).
35. See infra Part V (proposing that the lack of a majority opinion in Black will have an
uncertain impact on the regulation of expression and the public's perception of these laws).
36. See infra Part VI (concluding that the case was a significant First Amendment case, but
that it failed to provide a definitive interpretation of the First Amendment).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
38. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); see GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION: A COMMENTARY 52-53 (1995) ("The First Amendment
is the only one of the first eight amendments that is somewhat innovative .... These were rights
that were confirmed, not created, by the.., provisions of the First Amendment."). Professor
Anastaplo noted that the First Amendment does not protect absolutely the freedom of expression
because "[a]n unregulated freedom of expression can, in some circumstances, undermine the
character and education needed for sustained self-government." ANASTAPLO, supra, at 53-54.
He explained, "Freedom of expression ... is something that a people should want to see protected
to a considerable extent, but there is not for it the absolute protection that is confirmed by the
First Amendment for freedom of speech and of the press." Id. at 54.
39. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-83 (1957). All states made either blasphemy or
profanity or both statutory crimes as early as the ratification of the Constitution in 1792. Id. at
482. "In light of this history, it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First
Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance." Id. at 483; see also Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (stating that libel is not within the area of constitutionally
protected speech).
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history leading to the adoption of the First Amendment,40 explains the
rationale behind its guarantees, 4 1 and discusses the several doctrines
that the United States Supreme Court has used to analyze First
Amendment issues.42 Next, this Part discusses restrictions on freedom
of speech43 as well as the special protection granted to symbolic
speech. 44 This Part then examines hate crimes and speech, 5 paying
specific attention to cross burning.46 This Part concludes with a survey
of First Amendment jurisprudence regarding cross burning statutes. 47
A. The History of the First Amendment
Constitutional scholars have noted that the First Amendment was
unquestionably a reaction against the suppression of speech and the
press that existed in English society. 48  The framers49 foresaw the
40. See infra Part II.A (discussing the historical development of the First Amendment).
41. See infra Part II.B (explaining the four major rationales used by courts to justify the
fundamental nature of free speech).
42. See infra Part II.C.1 (describing content-neutral versus content-based regulations); infra
Part II.C.2 (describing the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines); infra Part II.C.3 (describing the
general presumption against prior restraints).
43. See infra Part II.D.1 (discussing the clear and present danger test); infra Part II.D.2
(discussing the true threats doctrine); infra Part II.D.3 (discussing the fighting words doctrine).
44. See infra Part II.E (explaining that symbolic speech is included in First Amendment
protections).
45. See infra Part II.F (reviewing legislation concerning hate crimes and hate speech).
46. See infra Part II.G (detailing the history of cross burning).
47. See infra Part II.H (discussing the holdings in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul and other cross
burning cases).
48. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 892 (2002);
see also NAT HENTOFF, THE FIRST FREEDOM: THE TUMULTUOUS HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN
AMERICA 57-68 (1980) (discussing the impact of England's speech-restrictive laws on the
development of the First Amendment). See generally THOMAS L. TEDFORD, FREEDOM OF
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 4-27 (1985) (providing a detailed description of the historical
regulation of expression, covering the evolution of the freedom of speech from Ancient Greece
and Italy through eighteenth-century England); David S. Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of
Speech and Press, 42 MD. L. REV. 429 (1983) (discussing more thoroughly the inception of the
First Amendment right to free speech); Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into
the Foundations and Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1279 (1998)
(advocating that "free speech is a right that is limited by the fundamental rights of other
individuals and the community as a whole"). Heyman explained that eighteenth-century
Americans understood free speech as a "right inherent in human nature.., that was bounded by
the rights of others." Heyman, supra, at 1279.
49. The original framers were fifty-five men who took part in the Federal Convention to revise
the Articles of Confederation. See ANASTAPLO, supra note 38, at 7-8 (summarizing the events
that led to the 1787 Federal Convention); see also M.E. BRADFORD, ORIGINAL INTENTIONS, at
xvi (1993) (describing then Governor of Virginia Edmund Randolph's view on the delegates who
were trying to ratify the revised Articles of Confederation for their states); WILLIAM PETERS, A
MORE PERFECT UNION: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 23-26 (1987)
(describing the previous experiences of the delegates involved with the Convention); FRED
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possibility of a democratic majority being as repressive as the English
monarchy. 50 Throughout the Constitutional Convention, the framers
argued about whether they should spell out the fundamental rights in the
body of the Constitution. 51 Some argued that there was no need for a
national bill of rights because many states already had adopted their
own declarations of rights.52 Others vehemently disagreed with this
claim, and James Madison, a vigorous advocate of a national bill of
rights, was one of the members of the House committee assigned to
study proposals for a national bill of rights. 53 In fact, he had his own
ideas about the protection of freedom of speech and religion that
involved raising them to the level of Constitutional rights. 54  Yet, the
original draft of the Constitution did not enumerate the individual rights
RODELL, 55 MEN: THE STORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 23 (Stackpole Books 1986) (1936)
(describing how the framers decided what they wanted and ultimately "set down on paper the
foundation of the United States").
50. See HENTOFF, supra note 48, at 71 (noting that the effect of democratic regulation on
individual dissenters would be the same as a monarch's regulation); THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at
384 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (addressing the "Alleged Tendency of the New
Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with
Representation").
51. See HENTOFF, supra note 48, at 71 (summarizing the main point of a letter written by
Madison to Jefferson in 1787); see THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 575 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob
E. Cooke ed., 1961) (asserting that "[t]he most considerable of these remaining objections... is
that the plan of the convention contains no bill of rights").
52. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1964) (describing the
relationship between the states' declarations and the proposals for a national bill of rights).
53. TEDFORD, supra note 48, at 38 (noting that Madison took the lead in the House of
Representatives to make the proposals for the First Amendment).
54. See id. (describing Madison's proposals for free speech protections). Madison's proposed
amendment was composed of three sections:
"The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or
worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal
rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.
The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write or to
publish their sentiments, and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of
liberty, shall be inviolable.
The people shall not be restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for
their common good; nor from applying to the legislature by petitions, or
remonstrances, for redress of their grievances."
Id. (quoting I ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1789)). Additionally, Madison proposed that the states
should be required to guarantee certain fundamental rights. Id. The House approved Madison's
proposal, but the Senate rejected it. Id. This resulted in a limitation on the federal government
and not on the state governments. Id. It was not until 1925 that the Supreme Court finally held
that the First Amendment could be applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding that the
freedom of speech was a fundamental right protected under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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of American citizens.55  To secure ratification of the Constitution, the
framers instead drafted an abbreviated version of Madison's proposed
amendment for the freedom of speech along with the rest of the Bill of
Rights. 56
On December 15, 1791, Virginia approved the proposed Bill of
Rights, becoming the last state to do so, thereby completing ratification
of these constitutional amendments. 57 With the First Amendment, the
framers created a limit on Congress's power to restrict speech.58
However, the enactment of the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798 brought
forth concerns that the First Amendment actually protected very little in
the form of speech.59 The Alien Act permitted the President to exile
aliens whom he believed were dangerous to the United States. 60  The
Sedition Act punished those who wrote scandalous and malicious
publications that the writer intended as defamation.6 1  Although the
Supreme Court never reviewed the constitutionality of the Sedition Act
before it expired in 1801, lower federal courts sustained the pro-
55. See CHAFEE, supra note 52, at 5 (noting that, even though the states each had adopted a
free speech provision, citizens were still dissatisfied that there was no federal assurance of this
right). For an extensive critical analysis of Chafee's First Amendment theories and study, see
Rabban, supra note 16, at 1283-1303.
56. TEDFORD, supra note 48, at 38. Unfortunately, the framers gave very little indication as to
the exact meaning of the Amendment. See CHAFEE, supra note 52, at 16 (noting, however, that
there are "a few important pieces of evidence to show that the words were used in the
Constitution in a wide and liberal sense").
57. GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST: NOTES ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT 24
(1971).
58. CHAFEE, supra note 52, at 30.
59. See id. at 23. However, Professor Chafee noted that the First Amendment's framers
"sought to preserve the fruits of the old victory abolishing the censorship, and to achieve a new
victory abolishing sedition prosecutions." Id. at 22. Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts
at the urging of Alexander Hamilton and the Federalist Party in response to poor relations with a
post-revolutionary France. Kathleen Sullivan, Freedom of Expression in the United States Past
and Present, in THE BOUNDARIES OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION & ORDER IN AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 2 (Thomas R. Hensley ed., 2001). These Acts allowed the President to expel aliens
perceived as dangerous and to punish the demonstration of ideas perceived as malicious toward
the United States government. Id.; see also The Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired
June 25, 1800) (allowing the government to take measures against aliens who opposed the
government's position); The Sedition Act, ch. 774, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired March 3, 1801)
(enumerating punishments for crimes against the United States). While the Alien Act was not
strongly enforced, the government vigorously prosecuted under the Sedition Act. TEDFORD,
supra note 48, at 47-48 (following incidents of the expression of free speech and their
consequences under the Sedition Act). For a more detailed explanation of the effects of the Alien
and Sedition Acts of 1798 and a description of the immediate reaction of the population after the
Act's adoption in 1798, see HENTOFF, supra note 48, at 79-85.
60. §§ 1-2, 1 Stat. 570.
61. § 2, 1 Stat. 596.
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censorship Act numerous times.62  It was not until 1964 that the
Supreme Court expressly declared that the Sedition Act violated the
Constitution.63
B. Rationales for the Freedom of Speech
The United States Supreme Court declared in Gitlow v. New York that
freedom of speech is a fundamental right.64 The Supreme Court has
relied on four core justifications in holding freedom of speech a
fundamental right.65 One justification for the protection of the freedom
of speech is self-governance. 66  Scholars have explained that the
freedom of speech is a crucial component to, and necessarily arises
from, a democratic society. 67 While political speech is at the core of
First Amendment protections, the Supreme Court has never accepted
the view that the First Amendment protects only political speech.68 The
second core justification for the protection of free speech is that it is
vital for the discovery of truth.69 Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes's
famous metaphor of the "marketplace of ideas," or the test of truth in
competition, supported this rationale for First Amendment protections.
70
62. HENTOFF, supra note 48, at 84.
63. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964). Justice Brennan stated,
"Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried
the day in the court of history." Id.
64. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). The Court noted that the "freedom of
speech and of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by
Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States." Id.
65. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 898-902 (explaining the four justifications as self-
governance, truth, autonomy, and tolerance); see also GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 9-18 (2d ed. 2003) (reiterating the rationales that Chemerinsky enumerated).
66. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 898-99.
67. Id. at 898. Political philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn wrote that the freedom of speech
"is a deduction from the basic American agreement that public issues shall be decided by
universal suffrage." ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 27 (1948). Justice Brennan characterized this right of the people as "the central
meaning of the First Amendment." N.Y Times Co., 376 U.S. at 273.
68. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 898-99. "In part, this is probably because of the
difficulty of defining what is political speech. Virtually everything from comic strips to
commercial advertisements to even pornography can have a political dimension." Id. at 899.
69. Id.
70. Id. This "marketplace of ideas" approach came from theories expressed by John Stuart
Mill and was utilized by Justice Holmes in his dissent in Abrams v. United States. See Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out."). Critics challenge the idea that
the marketplace of ideas will produce truth. See Paul H. Brietzke, How and Why the Marketplace
of Ideas Fails, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 951, 952 (1997) (arguing that the marketplace theory fails
because it relies solely on tenuous analogy, and "analogy is the weakest form of argument in
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A third rationale for the protection of free speech is that free speech is
an integral aspect of personal autonomy. 71  Some commentators
advocate that free speech allows fulfillment of a very basic human
proclivity toward creativity and self-expression, and others claim that it
serves as a part of a human's acceptance of his own autonomy. 72
Finally, a fourth justification for labeling the freedom of speech as a
fundamental right is that freedom of speech is central to tolerance of
others' ideas and such tolerance should be a basic value in our society. 73
All of the above-listed rationales are important to understanding why
and to what extent the Supreme Court uses certain approaches to protect
freedom of speech.74
C. The Ways in Which the Supreme Court Has Analyzed First
Amendment Issues
The Supreme Court has analyzed whether a statute violates the First
Amendment's protection of speech in three different ways.75 Often, the
Supreme Court applies many of these analyses within the same case,
logic"); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 17
(1984) (arguing that just as the economic market has flaws, so does the marketplace theory, as
each depends on constantly changing factors, and stating, "Due to developed legal doctrine and
the inevitable effects of socialization processes, mass communication technology, and unequal
allocations of resources, ideas that support an entrenched power structure or ideology are most
likely to gain acceptance within our current market"). See generally Darren Bush, The
"Marketplace of Ideas": Is Judge Posner Chasing Don Quixote's Windmills?, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1107 (2000) (asserting that the fact that some economic-minded legal theorists have extended
their analysis of free speech beyond traditional law and economics may hamper the search for
truth).
71. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 900-01; see also Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society:
A Response to Critics, 90 COLUM L. REV. 979, 981-82 (1990) (explaining that personal
autonomy cannot justify speech in every situation); STONE, supra note 65, at 14-15 (2003)
(describing different variations of the self-autonomy justification). Justice Marshall agreed with
this rationale and declared that "[t]he First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but
also those of the human spirit-a spirit that demands self-expression." Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).
72. STONE ET AL., supra note 65, at 14-15 (discussing several commentators' varying
versions of the self-autonomy justification); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 901
(stating that other justifications for speech emphasize its "instrumental values of expression").
73. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 901; see Jay Schiffman, Tolerance as Understanding, 3
MARGINS 1, 2 (2003) (setting forth a theory that "conceptualizes tolerance as a moral obligation
stemming from paramount moral virtues such as empathy and compassion, rather than as a means
for achieving liberal goals such as autonomy").
74. See infra Part II.C (outlining the different approaches the Supreme Court has used to
examine challenges based on First Amendment grounds).
75. See infra Part II.D (discussing the Supreme Court's rationale for holding certain areas of
speech protected under the First Amendment).
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causing confusion. 76 This section therefore outlines the three methods
of analyzing statutory challenges on First Amendment grounds: (1) the
distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws, (2) the
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, and (3) the general presumption
that prior restraint is invalid.77
1. Distinguishing Between Content-based and
Content-neutral Laws
The Supreme Court has stated that the First Amendment prohibits the
government from legislating against speech because the government
views the speech as controversial or unpleasant.78 Indeed, the Court has
explained that the core purpose of the First Amendment is to prevent the
government from creating such content-based statutes. 79 The Court has
created exceptions to this general prohibition on content-based
legislation; 80 however, the Court nevertheless imposes stricter scrutiny
on legislation that is content-based than legislation that is content-
neutral.81
76. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 903; see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in
Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV. 297, 304-05 (1997) (explaining that confusion also can
arise from the three-tiered analysis by the courts, where "three-tiered" means that the Supreme
Court applies strict scrutiny to content-based statutes, that it applies intermediate scrutiny to
content-neutral statutes, and that "although the Court has not expressly so held, its cases suggest
that minor and incidental burdens on speech imposed by laws not directed at speech as such are
subject to minimal or no First Amendment scrutiny").
77. See infra Part II.C. 1-3 (examining justifications for First Amendment challenges).
78. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). Justice Marshall wrote that "the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message,
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Id. at 95.
79. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 903 (citing Police Dep't, 408 U.S. at 95-96); see Simon
& Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)
(finding, under strict scrutiny, that the "Son of Sam" law was a content-based statute). The Son
of Sam law "require[d] any entity contracting with an accused or convicted person for a depiction
of the crime to submit a copy of the contract.., and to turn over any income under that contract
to the Board," and the statute applied to "all such contracts in any medium of communication."
Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 109. The Court subjected this statute to strict scrutiny, finding that
the "State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Id. at 118 (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Ark. Writers'
Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)). While the Court found that the state had a
legitimate interest in protecting the victims of crimes, the state had minimal interest in "limiting
such compensation to the proceeds of the wrongdoer's speech about the crime." Id. at 120.
80. See infra notes 205-11 and accompanying text (discussing the exceptions to the
prohibition on content-based statutes such as allowances for regulations on entire classes of
speech and statutes targeting secondary effects of speech).
81. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (explaining that content-based restrictions
"must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny"). The Court would have to analyze whether the
content discrimination fit into one of the exceptions before it could determine the statute's
constitutionality. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992) (stating that there may
be bases for classifying on content, but "to validate such selectivity (where totally proscribable
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A law that restricts speech is content-based if the government bases
its regulation on the subject matter or viewpoint of the expression. 82 In
contrast, a law is content-neutral if the government's justification for the
law does not relate to the content of the speech.83 The principal
question that the Supreme Court asks in its determination of the content-
neutrality of a law is whether the law has regulated speech with or
without reference to its content.84 For example, a law prohibiting cross
burning with the intent to intimidate someone based on that person's
race or sexual orientation is a content-based restriction. 85  If the Court
speech is at issue) it may not even be necessary to identify any particular 'neutral' basis, so long
as the nature of the content discrimination is such that there is no realistic possibility that official
suppression of ideas is afoot"). Additionally, for a state to enforce a content-based statute
constitutionally, it must show that the "regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). For an example of the Court's analysis of a content-neutral
statute, in which the appropriate inquiry is whether the statute serves a legitimate purpose and
allows for other means of communication, see City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S.
41, 50 (1986).
82. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 908; see also Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the
Content-based/Content Neutral and Content/Viewpoint Determinations, 34 McGEORGE L. REv.
595, 622 (2003) (allocating some of the confusion in First Amendment jurisprudence to the
definition of "content" and arguing that "the proper meaning of 'content' is the communicative
impact. The appropriate question is... whether its application depends upon the communicative
impact of the speech affected. If so, then the action is content-based.").
83. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 908; STONE ET AL., supra note 65, at 281; see also
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46, 54-57 (1987) (clarifying
the distinction between content-neutral and content-based restrictions and the concerns associated
with the approaches); Jacobs, supra note 82, at 619 (discussing the clarification required in the
content-neutral inquiry).
84. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). For an analysis of whether the
government has regulated speech based on content, see Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc.,
512 U.S. 753, 763-66 (1994). In Madsen, the Court evaluated an injunction that was imposed
because a group of people repeatedly violated a court order. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763. The fact
that the people against whom the injunction was enforced all had the same viewpoint regarding
abortion was not relevant. Id. The Court explained that where an injunction is at issue, it must
determine "whether the time, place, and manner regulations were 'narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest."' Id. at 764 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791). However,
because injunctions involve a higher risk of infringing on First Amendment rights than statutes
do, the Court later declared that it must use the more rigorous test of evaluating "whether the
challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than [is] necessary to serve a
significant government interest." Id. at 765; see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 721 (2000)
(holding that a Colorado statute was acceptably content-neutral, and stating, "We have never
held, or suggested, that it is improper to look at the content of an oral or written statement to
determine whether a rule of law applies to a course of conduct.").
85. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (finding that an Illinois statute prohibiting
picketing unless the picketing related to labor issues was unconstitutional and content-based
because it allowed speech only on the subject of labor); infra note 197 and accompanying text
(discussing the statute the Supreme Court found to be content-based in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul);
see also supra note 79 (discussing the rationale the Supreme Court used to strike down the Son of
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finds a statute to be content-based, it then uses strict scrutiny to analyze
the statute.86 An example of a content-neutral statute is one in which
the government prohibits the distribution of pamphlets or oral
communications within a certain distance from the entrance to a health
clinic. 87 The Court has accepted content-neutral statutes as valid so
long as the government has designed the statutes to serve a legitimate
purpose and alternate avenues of communication exist.88
2. The Vagueness and Overbreadth Doctrines
The Supreme Court also has recognized that one can challenge a
statute on First Amendment grounds because the regulation is
disproportionately vague or overbroad. 89  Both vagueness and
overbreadth are facial challenges to the constitutionality of a law
because of the potential applications of the law, not because of how the
state has actually applied the law. 90 For example, a person may
Sam law in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y State Crime Victims Board as an
impermissible regulation of content).
86. See supra note 76 (discussing the three levels of scrutiny used in Supreme Court analyses
of content-based and content-neutral statutes).
87. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 719 (determining that a Colorado statute placed no restrictions on
viewpoints and was thus content-neutral). The Colorado statute cited by the Court provided, in
part, as follows:
No person shall knowingly approach another person within eight feet of such person,
unless such other person consents, for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to,
displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such
other person in the public way or sidewalk area within a radius of one hundred feet
from any entrance door to a health care facility. Any person who violates this
subsection (3) commits a class 3 misdemeanor.
Id. at 707 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(3)). The Court in Hill stated that "when a
content-neutral regulation does not entirely foreclose any means of communication, it may satisfy
the tailoring requirement even though it is not the least restrictive or least intrusive means of
serving the statutory goal." Hill, 530 U.S. at 726.
88. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (finding that a zoning
ordinance regulating the location of adult movie theaters was constitutional because it was a
content-neutral "time, place, and manner regulation" and the government had substantial interest
in such regulation).
89. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 919; see STONE ET AL., supra note 65, at 113
(introducing the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines by explaining that "courts may invalidate
restrictions on expression because the means of suppression are impermissible, even though the
particular speech at issue might constitutionally be restricted by some other means").
90. STONE ET AL., supra note 65, at 117. "Under [a facial constitutional challenge], a state
law prohibiting any person to 'advocate unlawful conduct' is unconstitutional 'on its face'
because the law purports to forbid expression that the state may not constitutionally prohibit." Id.
For example, in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Court
has altered its traditional rules of standing to permit-in the First Amendment area-
"attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the
requisite narrow specificity."
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challenge a statute, arguing that the law is either vague or overbroad
based on its application to others, though not necessarily to himself.9 1
To determine whether a statute is facially invalid due to vagueness or
overbreadth, the Supreme Court first considers whether the legislation
seems to regulate expression that the Constitution traditionally has
protected.92 In determining the degree of vagueness, the Court uses a
reasonable person standard: whether a reasonable person could ascertain
what speech the law seeks to prohibit and what speech the law
permits.93 If a reasonable person could not determine what speech the
statute actually permits and prohibits because the statute fails to define
clearly the conduct it proscribes, then the statute is unconstitutionally
vague.94 A statute prohibiting abusive language that may cause a
breach of peace is an example of a vague statute.
95
To determine whether the law is overbroad, the Court analyzes
whether the law regulates more speech than the Constitution permits a
state to restrict. 96 Unconstitutional regulations of protected speech may
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,
486 (1965)). A facial challenge differs from the traditional as-applied approach-an approach
that "tests the constitutionality of the legislation as it is applied to particular facts on a case-by-
case basis." STONE ET AL., supra note 65, at 117.
91. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) ("This is deemed necessary because persons
whose expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for
fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected
expression.").
92. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988). The Court determines whether the statute
"reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct." Id.; see also Gooding, 405
U.S. at 528 (finding a Georgia statute prohibiting a breach of peace by use of abusive language to
be vague and overbroad).
93. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 919; STONE ET AL., supra note 65, at 122; see, e.g.,
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (applying the reasonable person standard
in analyzing an ordinance that prohibited groups of people to assemble on sidewalks). The
Supreme Court held that the statute in Coates was vague because "no standard of conduct is
specified at all .... [and,] [a]s a result, 'men of common intelligence must guess its meaning."'
Coates, 402 U.S. at 614. The Court then declared that the statute was facially unconstitutional
because of its vagueness. Id. at 615.
94. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 926 (explaining that "[a] law would be vague because a
reasonable person could not know what was outlawed and what was permitted"); STONE ET AL.,
supra note 65, at 122. Emphasizing the importance of this doctrine, Professor Stone noted,
The vagueness doctrine has special bite in the first amendment context, however, for
where First Amendment interests are affected, a precise statute evincing a legislative
judgment that certain specific conduct [be] proscribed, assures us that the legislature
has focused on the First Amendment interests and determined that other governmental
policies compel regulation.
STONE ET AL., supra note 65, at 122 (internal quotations omitted).
95. See, e.g., Gooding, 405 U.S. at 518-19 (describing a Georgia statute that the Court found
to be vague and overbroad).
96. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 921; see, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
615 (1973) (holding that an Oklahoma statute was not overbroad because the problem
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deter non-litigating parties from speaking, and therefore the law may
escape judicial examination. 97 Further, the Court has stated that for the
overbreadth to be unconstitutional, it must be both real and substantial,
as the doctrine is of limited application.98  Further, the state can
overcome a challenge of overbreadth by showing that it can construe the
statute narrowly, so as not to infringe upon constitutionally protected
speech.99
3. Prior Restraints: The Most Serious Infringements on First
Amendment Rights0 0
A prior restraint on speech occurs when a law prevents speech before
it is spoken. 10' Classic forms of prior restraints include court
injunctions and licensing systems that stop speech that the court deems
offensive. 10 2 For example, in an early prior restraint case, Near v.
Minnesota, the Supreme Court struck down a law that permitted the
government to enjoin a publication that accused a Chief of Police of not
fulfilling his duties.10 3 In Near, the Supreme Court held that it will
presume that laws enforcing prior restraints are unconstitutional. 104
complained of was not real and substantial); see also Gooding, 405 U.S. at 528 (finding a Georgia
statute to be both vague and overbroad).
97. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.8 (1980)
(explaining that the "overbreadth doctrine derives from the recognition that unconstitutional
restriction of expression may deter protected speech by parties not before the court and thereby
escape judicial review" (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612-13)).
98. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.
99. Id. at 613.
The consequence of our departure from traditional rules of standing in the First
Amendment area is that any enforcement of a statute thus placed at issue is totally
forbidden until and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it
as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expression.
Id. However, when the Court finds that a limiting construction has been placed or can be placed
on the statute, a facial challenge for overbreadth will not stand. Id.
100. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (stating that "prior restraints on
speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First
Amendment rights").
101. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 926. While prior restraint is most clearly defined as
"an administration system or judicial order that prevents speech from occurring," the definition of
prior restraint is often "elusive," and definitions can be "too broad." Id. The Supreme Court first
adopted the doctrine of prior restraint in the 1930s in Near v. Minnesota. Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
102. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 927. See generally Carolyn Grose, "Put Your Body on
the Line ": Civil Disobedience and Injunctions, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1497 (1994) (analyzing when,
in cases of civil disobedience, injunctions constitute prior restraints).
103. Near, 283 U.S. at 704.
104. Id. at 716.
The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal
does not make any the less necessary the immunity of the press from previous restraint
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Because of this presumption, the government bears a heavy burden of
showing good reason for the imposition of such prior restraint. 10 5  For
example, the Supreme Court held that a prior restraint on a state-created
resolution set forth to evaluate the morality of publications was
unconstitutional because the government did not meet its burden of
showing good reason. 10 6 However, the Supreme Court has recognized
certain areas in which prior restraints may be appropriate, including: (1)
restraints during war time, (2) enforcement of certain obscenity
regulations, and (3) enforcement of laws against incitement. 10 7  The
Supreme Court also has noted that it would permit a system of prior
restraint only where judges supervised and immediately determined the
validity of the restraints. 108
D. Restrictions on First Amendment Protections
The Supreme Court has refused to label all expression as speech
simply because the person intends to express an idea through his or her
actions10 9 and has singled out some categories of speech that do not
in dealing with official misconduct. Subsequent punishment for such abuses as may
exist is the appropriate remedy, consistent with constitutional privilege.
Id. at 720. This case established the doctrine that there is a presumption against prior restraint.
See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (holding that a prior restraint
against publishing in newspapers was unconstitutional); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S.
58, 70 (1963) (holding that the state censorship at issue suppressed ideas and violated the First
Amendment, concluding that "[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity").
105. See Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1971) (holding that the
injunction issued by the lower court violated the First Amendment because it was a prior
restraint); see also James L. Oakes, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint Since the Pentagon Papers,
15 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 497, 506-12 (1982) (contending that courts have dangerously
expanded the doctrine of prior restraint since N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, thus putting the
doctrine at risk of inconsistent application).
106. Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 72 (finding that the prior restraint was a "scheme of state
censorship").
107. Near, 283 U.S. at 716. See generally Elliot Mincberg, A Look at Recent Supreme Court
Decisions: Judicial Prior Restraint and the First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 872 (1993)
(attempting to reconcile the inconsistencies in different prior restraint cases by noting that the
cases involve two separate impulses: the libertarian impulse that defends the rights of the
individual and of freedom of expression and the "statist" impulse that defers more to the
government). For a critical analysis of the doctrine of prior restraint arguing that the doctrine of
prior restraint is unclear and inconsistent, see Ariel L. Bendor, Prior Restraint,
Incommensurability, and the Constitutionalism of Means, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 289, 295-97,
314-15 (1999).
108. Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 70.
109. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). See generally Nicholas Wolfson,
Free Speech Theory and Hateful Words, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1991) (arguing that hateful speech
neither serves a redeeming social value nor advances the search for truth and thus is a category of
speech undeserving of First Amendment protection); Fred C. Zacharias, Flowcharting the First
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qualify for protection and that the government may criminalize and
prosecute.' 10 This section will discuss the clear and present danger test
as one way through which the Supreme Court has restricted the freedom
of speech."' l Further, this section will discuss the Supreme Court's
reluctance to protect true threats1 12  and fighting words 1 13 as
constitutionally protected speech.
1. Schenck v. United States: The Clear and Present Danger Test
The first type of speech that the Supreme Court permitted the
government to restrict and criminalize was war-related conduct. 114 The
Court decided Schenck v. United States1 15 in the aftermath of World
War I, examining a challenge to the constitutionality of the Espionage
Act.116 Schenck was a landmark case because the Supreme Court
announced the clear and present danger test as a way of analyzing a
governmental restriction on free speech."l 7  The government had
charged Schenck with three counts of violating the Espionage Act of
June 15, 1917 for circulating leaflets urging men to refuse to enter into
the military draft.118 He appealed his conviction on the ground that the
Espionage Act violated the First Amendment, abridging his freedom of
Amendment, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 936, 937 (1987) (proposing "a model for analyzing all cases in
which the government selects and regulates individuals as a result of their political speech").
110. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, at 968 (discussing incitement of illegal activity, fighting
words, and obscenity as unprotected speech); see infra notes 116-21 and accompanying text
(discussing the areas of speech in which the government has sufficient interest to criminalize); see
also HENTOFF, supra note 48, at 123-30 (discussing the Supreme Court's confrontation of
seditious speech and that certain speech at wartime will not be protected by the First
Amendment); H.L. POHLMAN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDALL HOLMES 67 (1991) (analyzing
Schenck and theorizing that "Holmes treated conspiracy differently when speech was the primary
means that conspirators used to obtain their unlawful objective"). See generally Arielle D. Kane,
Note, Sticks and Stones: How Words Can Hurt, 43 B.C. L. REV. 159 (2001) (exploring litigation
tactics for private parties who suffered harm from another's speech that the Court considers
protected speech under Brandenburg v. Ohio).
111. See infra Part I.D. 1 (outlining the evolution of the clear and present danger test).
112. See infra Part II.D.2 (discussing the government's compelling interest to prohibit true
threats).
113. See infra Part II.D.3 (describing the fighting words doctrine).
114. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-53 (1919).
115. Id.
116. TEDFORD, supra note 48, at 69. Congress enacted the Espionage Act shortly after
America declared war against Germany in 1917 to prevent sabotage and the communication of
United States military secrets to the enemy. Id.; see Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, 40 Stat.
217, 219 (outlining a punishment scheme for spying).
117. TEDFORD, supra note 48, at 69-72; see Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. Schenck was the first of
the Espionage Act cases argued before the Supreme Court. TEDFORD, supra note 48, at 69.
118. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 48-49.
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speech. 119  The Supreme Court stated that although the First
Amendment would protect Schenck's conduct in ordinary
circumstances, an examination of the entire situation was necessary to
evaluate his conduct during times of war. 120 The Court concluded that
the First Amendment does not provide the same level of protection to
speech during wartime as it does during ordinary time because some
utterances may prove to be hindrances to war efforts. 121
The Court therefore set forth the clear and present danger test, in
which it examines whether the circumstances surrounding the speech
and the very nature of the speech create a clear and present danger of
substantive evils that Congress has the authority to prevent. 122  These
evils include an individual's or group's successful interference with
Congress's questioned power in a particular situation. 123  This test
permits the government to restrict speech that the First Amendment
otherwise would protect when the immediacy of the circumstances
presents additional risks of harm from the speech. 124  Thus, using the
clear and present danger test, the Court affirmed Schenck's convictions,
explaining that Schenck's draft-dodging leaflets were a hindrance to the
government during times of war. 125 Constitutional scholars have noted
that while Schenck sets forth the clear and present danger test, the Court
did not apply it rigorously in that case, and the test was taken to mean
bad tendency, or liability for speech that had a corrupt propensity
regardless of the speaker's intent. 126  However, the clear and present
119. Id. at49.
120. Id. at 52. while the Court admitted that in ordinary circumstances Schenck's conduct
and expression would be protected under the First Amendment, "the character of every act
depends upon the circumstances in which it is done." Id. Justice Holmes further stated, "The
most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a
theatre and causing a panic." Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Id. (emphasis added).
123. See CHAFEE, supra note 52, at 81 ("Although 'the substantive evils' are not specifically
defined, they mean successful interference with the particular power of Congress that is in
question-in this instance [referring to the situation in Schenck], the war power.").
124. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. The Supreme Court explained, "It is a question of proximity
and degree." Id.
125. Id.
126. TEDFORD, supra note 48, at 71-73; see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 625-31
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (advocating a more liberal standard of the clear and present
danger test and setting forth the marketplace of ideas rationale); POHLMAN, supra note 110, at 66
(explaining that even though Schenck did not lend itself to the clear and present danger standard,
an imperfect fit with the test did not automatically reduce the standard to bad tendency); STONE
ET AL., supra note 65, at 25 (questioning the clear and present danger standard employed by the
Schenck court, noting that "[u]nder this view, intent could be inferred from the tendency of the
1066 [Vol. 35
Burned Out
danger standard evolved to mean more than tendency and to include the
accompanying intent of the speech. 127
In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court again applied the clear and present
danger test. 128 However, this case showed the departure from the mere
tendency approach of the earlier Court and required that the government
prove that the danger was real. 129 In Brandenburg, the defendant was a
Klan leader in Ohio who spoke out at a rally, shouting statements such
as "Save America" and "Freedom for the Whites," as well as derogatory
and threatening statements about African Americans. 130  Prior to the
rally, the defendant had invited to the event a reporter and cameraman
who later broadcast part of the rally on a local television station as well
as the national network. 13 1 The state convicted Brandenburg under an
Ohio statute that made it illegal to gather for the purpose of criminal
syndicalism. 132  Brandenburg appealed his conviction on the ground
that the statute infringed on his First-Amendment-protected speech. 133
The Supreme Court reversed Brandenburg's conviction and declared
the Ohio statute an unconstitutional violation of the First
Amendment. 134  The Court stated that criminalizing advocacy and a
gathering to support this advocacy violates the First Amendment's
general protection of speech. 135 The Court further held that threatening
speech is protected unless the state can show the existence of a clear and
present danger. 136  Because the Supreme Court seriously had
speech itself, on the theory that one intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of one's
acts"); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(urging a more rigorous standard for the clear and present danger test where the state convicted a
defendant for being an active member of the Communist party), overruled by Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
127. See HENTOFF, supra note 48, at 130 (noting that the bad tendency test "was so broad, so
vague, that a judge or jury who despised certain ideas of a defendant could easily come to the
conclusion that these views were so dangerous ... that they tended to create great harm to
government"); supra note 126 and accompanying text (describing the ambition of Justices
Brandeis and Holmes to enforce a more rigorous standard for determining the existence of a clear
and present danger).
128. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969).
129. Id. at 448-49.
130. Id. at 445-46.
131. Id. at445.
132. Id. at 444. The statute in this case made it a crime to advocate "the duty, necessity, or
propriety of crime.., as a means of accomplishing... political reform." Id.
133. Id. at 445.
134. Id. at 449.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 447. The Court found that the state needed to prove that "such advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."
Id. It is also important to note Justice Douglas's concurring opinion, in which he wrote that the
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discredited its decision in Whitney v. California upholding a similar
law, the state could not show that mere advocacy of violence sufficed to
present a clear and present danger here, as the state had done in
Whitney. 137  The Court's decision in Brandenberg represented a
departure from Schenck's more meager analysis of the clear and present
danger nature of the speech the state sought to regulate.
138
2. The Government Has a Compelling Interest To Protect Against
"True Threats"
The Supreme Court has adopted the notion that the government has a
legitimate interest in protecting government officials against true threats
and that it therefore can regulate speech it deems a true threat. 139  In
Watts v. United States, the Court considered a challenge to a federal
statute that made it illegal to threaten the President of the United
States. 140 The defendant made a statement about not wanting to be
drafted into the military and protested the possibility of having to carry
a gun, stating that if he were forced to carry a gun, he would locate the
President and place the President in his gun sights first. 141 While the
Court noted that the federal government has a compelling interest in
protecting the safety of its Chief Executive, the Court also found that
the statute requires the government to prove that a true threat results
from this expression, not merely a sign of political protest, in order to
clear and present danger test "is not reconcilable with the First Amendment in days of peace." Id.
at 452 (Douglas, J., concurring). But see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968)
(holding that because the government had a legitimate interest in assuring the continued
availability of Selective Service certificates, restricting the burning of these certificates was not
abridging freedom of speech). See also Jeffrey A. Steele, Comment, Fighting the Devil with a
Double-edged Sword: Is the Speech-invoked Hostile Work Environment Hostile to O'Brien?, 72
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 83, 91 (1994) (discussing "whether an O'Brien analysis would support a
statute that, while clearly directed toward the elimination of constitutionally proscribable
discriminatory conduct, is triggered by an unfavorable reaction to a disfavored message"); Jordan
Strauss, Context Is Everything: Towards a More Flexible Rule for Evaluating True Threats Under
the First Amendment, 32 Sw. U. L. REV. 231, 233 (2003) (urging the Supreme Court "to adopt a
declarant-and-recipient-based objective standard for threat speech that is flexible enough to take
into account the medium through which an alleged threat is transmitted").
137. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447; see supra note 126 (citing the Whitney case).
138. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text (analyzing the Supreme Court's usage of
the clear and present danger test in Schenck v. United States).
139. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969). The Supreme Court stated, "The
Nation undoubtedly has a valid, even an overwhelming, interest in protecting the safety of its
Chief Executive and in allowing him to perform his duties without interference from threats of
physical violence." Id.
140. Id. (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 871, which made it illegal to threaten the President of the
United States).
141. Id. at 706. The defendant stated that if the government ever made him carry a gun, "the
first man [he wanted] to get in [his] sights [was] L.B.J." Id.
prohibit that expression. 14 2 The Court found that because political
speech is often imprecise and obnoxious, the statement made by the
plaintiff was not a true threat, and he therefore should be acquitted.
143
However, the Court stated that the government had a legitimate interest
in protecting the President against any possible threats and therefore
held that the law at issue was facially constitutional. 144
3. The State Can Restrict "Fighting Words"
The Supreme Court established the fighting words doctrine in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire by holding that there are certain words in
the English language that the Court will consider fighting words and
that those words thus receive no protection under the First
Amendment. 145  In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court
explained that words constitute fighting words if they would cause men
of ordinary intelligence to start a fight and that such words could
include profanity, obscenity, or threats. 146  Fighting words differ from
speech posing a clear and present danger because they involve face-to-
face encounters, while the clear and present danger doctrine usually
involves the incitement of crowds or subversive advocacy directed at
the general public. 147
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court found that the New
Hampshire statute at issue was constitutional because it prohibited
fighting words. 148  The New Hampshire statute made it illegal to
142. Id. at 708; see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (employing a
hypothetical involving the President to show when content discrimination exists without danger).
143. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708. The Court termed political speech "vituperative, abusive, and
inexact." Id.
144. Id. at 707. In interpreting the statute, however, the Court stated that a statute that
criminalizes pure speech must distinguish clearly between the conduct prohibited and
constitutionally protected speech. Id. Justice Douglas concurred in the opinion and compared the
statute at issue to the Alien and Sedition Acts, "one of our sorriest chapters." Id. at 710 (Douglas,
J., concurring). See generally supra note 136 (noting Justice Douglas' statement that the clear
and present danger test should not be used to analyze First Amendment issues).
145. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942). Fighting words can include
those directed at someone to provoke them via profanity or obscenity. Id. See generally
MARTHA T. ZINGO, SEX/GENDER OUTSIDERS, HATE SPEECH, AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION:
CAN THEY SAY THAT ABOUT ME? 139 (1998) (explaining the importance of the fighting words
doctrine by noting that even today, "the fighting words doctrine is at the center of legal discourse
regarding hate speech regulations"); infra notes 180-86 and accompanying text (describing hate
crime legislation and its criticisms).
146. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
147. Id.; see supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text (discussing the clear and present
danger test in an incitement to violence context in the Brandenburg case).
148. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
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provoke someone by using derogatory, annoying, or offensive words. 149
The state convicted the defendant under this statute for publicly calling
someone a "Fascist" and a "racketeer." 150  The defendant appealed his
conviction on the ground that the New Hampshire statute violated his
First Amendment right because it placed an unreasonable restraint on
his freedom of speech and was vague and indefinite. 15 1
In analyzing the constitutional claim, the Court acknowledged that
the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and in all
circumstances. 152  Namely, the Court stated that the First Amendment
does not protect fighting words. 153  Fighting words generally do not
have expressive value; if they do, social interest in prohibiting these
words outweighs their slight benefit to society. 154
The United States Supreme Court has reiterated through its many
First Amendment decisions that not all expression warrants protection
under the First Amendment. 155 The Court has restricted freedom of
speech through its use of the clear and present danger test and the
prohibition of certain expressions classified as true threats or fighting
149. Id. at 569. The statute stated:
No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person
who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any offensive or
derisive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with
intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful
business or occupation.
Id. at 569 (quoting chapter 378, section 2, of the Public Laws of New Hampshire).
150. Id. His disparaging statements were, "You are a God damned racketeer" and "a damned
Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists." Id.
151. Id. See generally supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (explaining the vagueness
doctrine).
152. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571. Since the statute was narrowly drawn to prohibit only
fighting words, the Court disposed of the defendant's claim that the statute was vague. Id. at 573.
153. Id. at 572 (citing ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 149
(1941)). The Court defined fighting words as those words that by their utterance "inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Id. The Court consequently has held that
fighting words are generally proscribable under the First Amendment. Id. at 571-72 ("There are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem .... It has been well
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas ...."); see also
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (defining fighting words as "those personally abusive
epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge,
inherently likely to provoke violent reaction").
154. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. "It has been well observed that such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality." Id.
155. See supra Part H.D (outlining the various restrictions the Supreme Court has set forth
limiting the right to free speech).
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words. 156  Thus, while the First Amendment's freedom of speech is
fundamental, there are limitations on this right for the protection of
United States citizens and the government. 15
7
E. The Court's Analysis of Symbolic Speech
The Court has recognized symbols as important forms of
communication and thus has granted their use some protection under the
First Amendment. 158  Further, the Court has recognized that when a
speaker combines speech and non-speech elements to express himself,
the First Amendment protects him at times. 159 Symbols have been used
most frequently to protest policies of the American government and to
express a contrary viewpoint. 160 The Supreme Court consistently has
upheld this right to protest. 16 1  In evaluating symbols, the Supreme
Court has set forth a two-prong test. 162 The first question is whether the
156. See supra Part II.D.1-3 (explaining the different doctrines under which the Supreme
Court has limited an individual's right to free speech).
157. See supra Part II.D.1-3 (discussing the clear and present danger test and the state's
ability to restrict true threats and fighting words in accordance with the First Amendment's
protection of freedom of speech).
158. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1943) (noting
that "[s]ymbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas" and emphasizing that
a person "gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what is one man's comfort and
inspiration is another man's jest and scorn").
159. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). See generally Peter Meijes Tiersma,
Nonverbal Communication and the Freedom of "Speech," 1993 Wis. L. REV. 1525, 1526
(proposing a theory for determining when the Constitution protects non-speech under the First
Amendment and stating that, under the theory, the requirements for protection are that (1) the
"action must have meaning" and (2) "the actor must intend to communicate by means of the
action").
160. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)
(explaining that "in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression"). In Tinker, students were suspended for
wearing black armbands to school that expressed an opposition to the hostilities in Vietnam. Id.
at 504. They brought suit on the ground that the suspension was a restriction on their freedom of
expression rights. Id. The Court held that the school was wrong in denying the students their
form of expression and that the students' suspension was indeed a violation of the First
Amendment. Id. at 514.
161. Id. at 508-09. Further, Justice Fortas elaborated that "this sort of hazardous freedom...
is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up
and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society." Id.; see also United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983) (reiterating that "[p]eaceful picketing and leafletting are
expressive activities involving "speech" protected by the First Amendment"); Gregory v. City of
Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 113 (1969) (reversing a decision of the Illinois Supreme Court that
upheld the convictions of peaceful protestors, holding that the protestors' acts were entitled to
First Amendment protection).
162. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-12 (1974). This test reflects a departure
from the four-prong test set forth in United States v. O'Brien. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376
(explaining that the Supreme Court will find sufficient justification for a government regulation if
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conduct constitutes speech. 163 In analyzing this question, the court will
look at three factors: (1) the intent of the speaker; (2) the likelihood that
the audience will understand the message that the speaker seeks to
convey, if any; and (3) the context of the activity. 164 If the court finds
that the conduct is speech, it then evaluates whether the state's interests
are sufficiently significant that the state can justify interference with a
person's constitutional rights. 165
The Supreme Court first applied this two-prong test in Spence v.
Washington, where it evaluated conduct as a manner of expression. 166
Spence displayed a United States flag with a peace symbol attached to
both surfaces of the flag out of the window of his apartment. 167 The
state convicted him under a Washington statute that made it a crime to
display an American flag with extraneous material attached. 168 Spence
testified that he desired to associate the flag with peace rather than war
(1) "it is within the constitutional power of the Government," (2) "it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest," (3) "the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression," and (4) "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest").
163. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410.
164. Id. at410-11.
165. Id. at 412.
166. Id. at 405; see Joshua Waldman, Note, Symbolic Speech and Social Meaning, 97 COLUM.
L. REV. 1844, 1851-53 (1997) (discussing several applications of the Spence test and the three
factors that courts use to determine whether the conduct at issue is in fact speech). See generally
Benjamin Means, Criminal Speech and the First Amendment, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 501, 516-24
(analyzing and synthesizing the test announced in Spence to contend that states should
criminalize certain types of speech). Waldman wrote, "The traditional conception of Spence has
ostensibly focused on the actual intent of the actor and on the case-specific facts at issue."
Waldman, supra, at 1844.
167. Spence, 418 U.S. at 405.
168. Id. Rather than being convicted under the flag desecration statute, Spence was convicted
under the "improper use" statute. Id. at 407. The improper use statute states:
No person shall, in any manner, for exhibition or display:
(1) Place or cause to be placed any word, figure, mark, picture, design,
drawing or advertisement of any nature upon any flag, standard, color, ensign or
shield of the United States or of this state, or authorized by any law of the United
States or of this state; or
(2) Expose to public view any such flag, standard, color, ensign or shield
upon which shall have been printed, painted or otherwise produced, or to which
shall have been attached, appended, affixed or annexed any such word, figure,
mark, picture, design, drawing or advertisement; or
(3) Expose to public view for sale, manufacture, or otherwise, or to sell, give,
or have in possession for sale, for gift or for use for any purpose, any substance,
being an article of merchandise, or receptacle, or thing for holding or carrying
merchandise, upon or to which shall have been produced or attached any such
flag, standard, color, ensign or shield, in order to advertise, call attention to,
decorate, mark or distinguish such article or substance.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.86.020 (2000) (effective until July 1, 2004).
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and violence by attaching the peace symbol thereto. 169 The Supreme
Court concluded that there was no question that Spence was using
symbols as a manner of expression. 170 Therefore, the Court overturned
Spence's conviction. 17
1
Another controversial use of symbols as expression is examined in
Texas v. Johnson, in which the Court looked at a Texas statutory
prohibition on burning the American flag. 172 The Court analyzed flag
burning under the First Amendment. 173  The state of Texas had
convicted Johnson under a Texas statute that prohibited the desecration
of an American flag. 174 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
explained that it first must determine whether the flag burning
constituted expressive conduct protected under the First Amendment. 175
169. Spence, 418 U.S. at 408. Spence was protesting events that happened a few days prior to
his arrest-the invasion of Cambodia and the killings at Kent State University. Id.
170. Id. at 415. The Court explained that "his message was direct, likely to be understood,
and within the contours of the First Amendment." Id.
171. Id.
172. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 400 (1989); see James R. Dyer, Comment, Texas v.
Johnson: Symbolic Speech and Flag Desecration Under the First Amendment, 25 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 895, 902 (discussing the impact Texas v. Johnson has had on symbolic speech); Al Kamen,
Court Nullifies Flag-desecration Laws; First Amendment Is Held To Protect Burnings During
Political Demonstrations, WASH. POST, June 22, 1989, at Al (describing the "emotional impact
on the court" as "evident" because Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion contained the text of the
Star-Spangled Banner along with quotes from other patriotic material and because of Justice
Stevens's unusual act of reading his opinion aloud from the bench); see also Fred Strasser &
Marcia Coyle, Final Stretch, NAT'L L.J., June 12, 1989, at 5 (quoting a professor as stating that
"some First Amendment cases, such as the flag-burning dispute, while fairly simple in the legal
analysis, demand greater diplomacy in writing because of the depth of feelings held by large
segments of the population on both sides of these issues").
173. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403.
174. Id. at 400. Johnson had participated in a political demonstration that had the purpose of
protesting the policies of the Reagan administration. Id. at 399. Johnson set an American flag on
fire during this demonstration. Id. He was convicted under the following statute:
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly desecrates:
(1) a public monument;
(2) a place of worship or burial; or
(3) a state or national flag.
(b) For purposes of this section, "desecrate" means deface, damage, or otherwise
physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or more
persons likely to observe or discover his action.
(c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
TEX. PEN. CODE. ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon 1989).
175. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399. The Court stated that if it deemed the conduct expressive, it
then would decide whether the State's regulation related to the suppression of free expression.
Id.; see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (noting that legislation is related to "the
suppression of free expression" if it was ratified or directed to suppress conduct because of the
ideas expressed or their "emotive impact" on the audience of the conduct). If the regulation is not
related to expression, then the Court will use a less stringent standard. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 402.
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The Court held that the state had convicted Johnson for engaging in
constitutionally protected expressive conduct and that since there was
no prevailing state interest in preventing his conduct, the Court would
affirm the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and overturn his
conviction. 176 Although many Americans may find the act of burning a
flag as an expression of protest offensive, the Court found that this act
was not offensive enough to overcome the protection guaranteed by the
First Amendment. 177 Yet, the Court noted that it did not automatically
conclude that any action taken with respect to the American flag is
expressive, and it stated that it must consider the context in which the
conduct occurred. 178  While First Amendment protection of symbolic
speech can be more controversial than protections of other forms of
speech, provided that the speech does not involve an area unprotected
under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court generally will protect
symbolic expression. 179
F. Legislation of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech
Hate crimes are violent crimes in which racial or other bigotry
motivates the offender. 180 Hate speech refers to disparaging language
directed toward an individual or group based on ethnicity, national
origin, gender, sexual orientation, or any other classification of
individuals. 181  Both hate crimes and hate speech garner attention
The Court refers to the standard announced in United States v. O'Brien. Id. at 403; see supra
note 162 (citing O'Brien and noting the standard against which the government may justify a
regulation). This is a lesser standard of review than strict scrutiny because the governmental
interest is not related to the suppression of free speech. Id. However, if the regulation relates to
expression, the Court notes that it must "ask whether this interest justifies ... [the] conviction
under a more demanding standard." Johnson, 491 U.S. at 402.
176. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420.
177. Id. at 414.
178. Id. at 405. See generally supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text (discussing the
Spence case and the Court's approach to symbolic speech).
179. See supra notes 156-63 and accompanying text (outlining the test the Supreme Court has
used in analyzing whether symbolic speech warrants protection under the First Amendment).
180. FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW 9
(1999). A hate crime is a criminal offense motivated by hostility toward a racial or ethnic group
or toward an individual because of his association with that group. Id.; see Edward M. Kennedy,
Hate Crimes: The Unfinished Business of America, BOSTON B.J., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 6, 6
(describing hate crimes as a "modern plague afflicting communities throughout the nation"); see
also Michael S. Degan, "Adding the First Amendment to the Fire": Cross Burning and Hate
Crime Laws, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1109, 1112-13 (1993) (setting forth three parts to a hate
crime: "(1) a criminal act, (2) committed against a victim because of the victim's membership in
a particular class, and (3) usually accompanied by bias-related speech").
181. Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative
Analysis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1523 (2003) (defining hate speech as "speech designed to
promote hatred on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, or national origin"); see Kennedy, supra
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because of the impact they can leave on the victims and society in
general. 182 Hate crime offenders can be punished under federal law,
183
which prohibits the interference or intimidation of a person because of
his or her race or other identifying trait. 184 State and federal legislatures
also have responded to hate crimes with the development of penalty-
enhancement statutes1 85  and statutes that punish hate crimes as
substantive crimes in themselves. 186 Legislation dealing with hate
note 180, at 23 (differentiating between hate crimes and hate speech, stating, "Hate speech is
protected by the First Amendment except in rare cases where it is used to incite violence. By
contrast, bias-motivated acts of violence have no First Amendment protection.").
182. Patrick O'Driscoll, Booklets To Help Fight Against Hate Crimes: Copies Being Sent to
Nearly 1 Million Officials, Schools, U.S.A. TODAY, Sept. 17, 1999, at 4A, available at 1999 WL
6853774; see, e.g., infra note 325 (describing the impact that a burning cross had on one
particular family).
183. 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (2000). This statute punishes a person who, "whether or not acting
under color of law, by force or threat of force willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with, or
attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with ... any person because of his race, color, religion
or national origin." Id. Compare Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics,
Expressive Law, or Tool for Criminal Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1250 (2000) (arguing
that the federal government does not have a police power with which to regulate hate crimes),
with Charles H. Jones, Jr., An Argument for Federal Protection Against Racially Motivated
Crimes: 18 U.S.C. § 241 and the Thirteenth Amendment, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 689, 691
(setting forth the argument that 18 U.S.C. § 241 and § 245 "may be effectively and
constitutionally employed to provide redress to victims of racially motivated violence"). See
generally infra note 192 (discussing courts' application of the federal statute in a cross burning
context).
184. See supra note 183 (discussing the federal hate crimes statute along with the legislative
history behind 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)). See generally JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER,
HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW & IDENTITY POLITICS 6, 29-44 (1998) (examining different hate
crime statutes).
185. Degan, supra note 181, at 1116. See generally Degan, supra note 181, at 115.1 (arguing
that punishing an individual more severely for his or her motive or bias in a crime is tantamount
to punishing a particular viewpoint); Andrew E. Taslitz, Condemning the Racist Personality: Why
the Critics of Hate Crimes Legislation Are Wrong, 40 B.C. L. REV. 739, 742 (1999) (attacking
criticism of penalty-enhancement statutes). Degan explains that penalty-enhancing statutes
"increase the penalty associated with the underlying criminal act, such as assault, trespass, or
battery, where a biased motivation is found." Degan, supra note 181, at 1116. Note that the
Supreme Court declared Wisconsin's penalty enhancement statute constitutional under a First
Amendment challenge in Wisconsin v. Mitchell. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-90
(1993) (finding that the Wisconsin penalty-enhancement statute did not violate the First
Amendment because "the Wisconsin statute singles out for enhancement bias-inspired conduct
because this conduct is thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm"). The Wisconsin
statute provides for penalty enhancement in situations where the offender "[i]ntentionally selects
the person against whom the crime... is committed or selects the property that is damaged or
otherwise affected by the crime.., because of the race, religion, color, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person or the owner or occupant of that property."
WIS. STAT. § 939.645(1)(b) (2001).
186. See infra note 197 and accompanying text (quoting the St. Paul ordinance from R.A. V. v.
City of St. Paul); see also ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, COMBATING HATE, STATE HATE CRIMES
STATUTORY PROVISIONS, at http://www.adl.org (last visited June 6, 2004) (highlighting hate
crime legislation throughout the United States).
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crimes or hate speech often finds justification in the fighting words
doctrine because the speech involved usually is of little social value. 187
G. A History of Cross Burning and its Regulation
Commentators, along with the Supreme Court, historically have
recognized a burning cross as an expression of racial hatred.18 8 For
instance, the Klan often used cross burnings as a way to communicate
both threats of violence and shared ideals of white supremacy. 189 The
act of cross burning does not necessarily involve intent to intimidate;
however, the Klan frequently used cross burnings to intimidate and
convey a threat of impending violence. 190 The continued use of cross
burning as a threat, particularly in the South, led many states to enact
statutes that regulated cross burning. 191 These states justified their cross
burning statutes by pointing to the South's nefarious history of cross
burning and doctrines of unprotected speech such as the fighting words
doctrine. 192
187. See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, COMBATING HATE, at http://www.adl.org (last visited
Mar. 7, 2004) (highlighting different areas in which hate crime has affected society). See
generally supra Part I.D.3 (discussing the fighting words doctrine).
188. Lesley C. Barlow, Crimes: Schoolyard Cross-burning: Free Speech or Felony?, 30
MCGEORGE L. REV. 499, 504 (1999). A California court justified a statute prohibiting cross
burning on school property on the ground that burning a cross is "an act of terrorism that inflicts
pain on its victim, not the expression of an idea." Id. (quoting In re Steven S., 25 Cal. App. 4th
598, 612-13 (Ct. App. 1994)); see also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515
U.S. 753, 771 (Thomas, J., concurring) (declaring that the burning cross is not a religious symbol
but rather a "symbol of hate"); Rosenfeld, supra note 181, at 1540 (noting that "[u]ndoubtedly,
cross burning itself is rejected as repugnant by the vast majority of Americans").
189. Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1545 (2003); see Grand Jury Questions 2 on '63
Racist Bombing, NEWSDAY (New York), Aug. 20, 1999, at A26, available at LEXIS, Newsday
News File (discussing the investigation of a 1963 church bombing that killed four African
American girls during a period of great Klan violence); see also In re Steven S., 25 Cal. App. 4th
598, 607 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the California cross burning statute implicated the true
threats and the fighting words doctrines). In In re Steven S., one woman testified:
[T]he incident caused [me] to feel "[s]cared out of my life" and threatened with
vengeance (presumably for her marriage to an African American): "To my
understanding a cross burning means the KKK. They're the ones that invented it. It's
vengeance if anything, they symbolize to do that for hate [sic] and when they burn
crosses on people's yards it's a threat to their life. I took it as a threat to my life .
In re Steven S., 25 Cal. App. 4th at 607.
190. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1546.
191. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing the Virginia cross burning statute
and its justifications); infra notes 192, 217 (discussing cases examining other states' cross
burning statutes).
192. Barlow, supra note 188, at 508 (arguing that cross burning constitutes fighting words in
certain circumstances). Federal courts also have examined the action of cross burning under the
context of a violation of civil rights. For an example of the application of the federal civil rights
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000), in a cross burning context, see United States v. Stewart, 65 F.3d
918, 928 (11 th Cir. 1995), in which it was held that convicting defendants of burning a cross did
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H. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: Cross Burning Statutes and Their
Treatment in the Courts
The last time the Supreme Court evaluated a statute that prohibited
cross burning was in the 1992 case R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.1 93 In St.
Paul, the defendant and several other white teenagers assembled a cross
from broken chair legs. 194  The teenagers then allegedly burned this
cross in the fenced-in yard of an African American family living across
the street from one of the teenagers. 195 The city of St. Paul convicted
the teenagers under its ordinance that prohibited cross burning. 196 The
ordinance rendered cross burning a crime only if the burning was
known to cause anger or resentment in a person of a particular race or of
a particular religion. 197
The Supreme Court held that the St. Paul ordinance was facially
unconstitutional because it contained an impermissible content-based
prohibition. 198  The Court recognized that it must follow the
authoritative statement of the Minnesota Supreme Court that the
ordinance reached only those expressions that constituted fighting
not violate the First Amendment because the defendants were engaging in "an activity-
threatening, intimidating, and interfering with the rights of [others] and using fire to do so." See
United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821, 825 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 241 did not
discriminate against viewpoints and therefore did not violate the First Amendment). Compare
United States v. McDermott, 822 F. Supp. 582, 591 (N.D. Iowa 1993) (holding that 18 U.S.C.
§ 241 did not violate the First Amendment because the statute aimed at controlling unprotected
threats, not expression protected under the First Amendment), with United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d
1297, 1301 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 241 violated the First Amendment as
applied in this case because of erroneous jury instructions that showed that the government
interest was the suppression of expression). This statute, entitled "Conspiracy Against Rights,"
provides in part for a fine or imprisonment of those who "conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or
intimidate any person in any State ... in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege
secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 241.
193. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
194. Id. at 379.
195. Id
196. Id. at 379-80.
197. Id. at 380 (citing ST. PAUL LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)). The statute stated:
"Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi
swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits
disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
Id. (quoting ST. PAUL LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
198. Id. at 391. See generally supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing facial
challenges).
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words within the meaning of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.199 Despite
the ordinance's prohibition of fighting words only, the Supreme Court
nonetheless found that the ordinance was facially unconstitutional
because it forbade certain speech solely based on the speech's
content.200
The Court noted that content-based regulations trigger a presumption
of invalidity because the First Amendment generally precludes the
government from prohibiting speech or expressive conduct based on
disapproval of the expression.20 1 In reviewing the St. Paul ordinance,
the Court stated that although the First Amendment does not afford
protection to all areas of expression, the government may not use
legislation as a vehicle for content discrimination. 20 2 The Court also
noted that the First Amendment permits the government to ban a
nonverbal expressive activity because of the action it involves, but not
the ideas it expresses. 20 3 However, it noted a few instances in which a
content-based regulation might pass constitutional muster. 204
The Supreme Court laid out several exceptions to the proscription
against content-based regulation. 20 5 For instance, a state may prohibit
content if the basis of the discrimination is that the entire class of speech
is proscribable. 20 6 The Court also set forth an exception for when the
199. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381 ("[I]n construing the St. Paul ordinance, we are bound by the
construction given to it by the Minnesota court."); see supra Part II.D.3 (discussing the fighting
words doctrine and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire).
200. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381. In analyzing the content-neutrality of legislation, the Court has
noted that it first must look at the rationale for the regulation. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (finding that "the government may impose reasonable restrictions on
the time, place, or manner of protected speech" if "the restrictions 'are justified without reference
to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of
the information' (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984))).
The Court held that the "principal inquiry... is whether the government has adopted a regulation
of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys." Id.
201. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at382.
202. Id. at 383-84. The Court also noted that although some courts have mentioned that these
unprotected areas are not speech, the courts really mean that "these areas of speech can,
consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally
proscribable content... not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the
Constitution." Id. at 383.
203. Id. at 385.
204. Id. at 387; see infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text (outlining the exceptions the
Supreme Court set forth in R.A. V.).
205. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388.
206. Id. The Court gave the example that a statute may prohibit obscenity that exhibits the
"most lascivious displays of sexual activity," but it may not prohibit "only that obscenity which
includes offensive political messages." Id. (referring to Kucharek v. Hanaway, 902 F.2d 513, 517
(7th Cir. 1990)); see supra Part II.D.2 (explaining why the government can constitutionally
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statute targets secondary effects of the speech so that the regulation is
warranted without any mention of the speech.2°7 Further, the Court
noted that a state may impose content-based regulation within a statute
that prohibits conduct, not speech.20 8
The Court found that the St. Paul ordinance did not fit into the first
exception because the city proscribed particular fighting words based on
communication of messages of race, gender, or religious bigotry.
20 9
The St. Paul ordinance did not fall into the second exception because
effects on listeners do not qualify as secondary effects. 210  Further, the
Court found that St. Paul did not have a sufficiently compelling interest
to justify content discrimination, thus it failed to satisfy the third
exception. 211 Therefore, the Court found the St. Paul ordinance to be
facially unconstitutional.2 12
Although the speech regulated was limited to fighting words, the
Court recognized that abusive expressions are permissible unless
addressed to a specifically enumerated topic in the ordinance. 213 The
Court explained that the First Amendment does not allow the city to
prohibit speech that it considers to be unfavorable. 214  The Court
articulated that the St. Paul ordinance not only discriminated on the
basis of content, but also discriminated against a certain viewpoint. 215
prohibit true threats against the President). The Court also mentioned that while it is acceptable
to uphold a law prohibiting threats against the President, it is unacceptable to criminalize only
those threats against the President that mention certain specific policy decisions. R.A. V., 505 U.S.
at 388. The Court noted, "Where the government does not target conduct on the basis of its
expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a
discriminatory idea or philosophy." Id. at 390.
207. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389 ("Another valid basis for according differential treatment to even
a content-defined subclass of proscribable speech is that the subclass happens to be associated
with particular 'secondary effects' of the speech, so that the regulation is 'justified without
reference to the content of the ... speech."' (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986))).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 393-94. "[T]he reason why fighting words are categorically excluded from the
protection of the First Amendment is not that their content communicates a particularly
intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of expressing whatever the speaker wishes to
convey." Id. at 393.
210. Id. at 394. "The emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a 'secondary effect."'
Id. (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
211. Id. at 395-96.
212. Id. at 391.
213. Id.
214. Id. Further, the Court explained that the city is not permitted to "impose special
prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects." Id.
215. Id. The Supreme Court has defined viewpoint discrimination as the regulation of speech
based on "the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker" and as
"an egregious form of content discrimination." Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995);
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While concluding that burning a cross is a reprehensible activity, the
Court held that St. Paul had other means to prevent this activity without
infringing on the First Amendment, and therefore the St. Paul ordinance
was unconstitutional.2 16
After the Supreme Court decided R.A. V., state courts evaluated
similar statutes that prohibit cross burning and reached conflicting
results. 217 The determining factor in these cases was whether the
purpose of the statute was to regulate content or reprehensible
conduct.218  However, a comparison of these cases does not lead to a
conclusive understanding as to how courts should address the First
Amendment concerns in cross burning statutes.219  Because so many
questions still existed after the R.A.V. case, it was clear that the
see supra Part ll.C. I (discussing the distinction between content-based and content-neutral
statutes and this distinction's significance in First Amendment analysis). The Court often has
noted the importance of viewpoint neutrality with respect to the First Amendment. See Nicole B.
Casarez, Public Forums, Selective Subsidies, and Shifting Standards of Viewpoint Discrimination,
64 ALB. L. REV. 501, 505-06 (2000) (noting that the mandate of viewpoint neutrality arose in the
"traditional public forum and general speech domains," and discussing the early Supreme Court
cases that advanced First Amendment protection).
216. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396. Justice White concurred with the majority; however, he argued
that the statute should be declared facially unconstitutional because it was overbroad, explaining
that "it criminalizes not only unprotected expression but expression protected by the First
Amendment." Id. at 397 (White, J., concurring). Justice Stevens also wrote a concurring opinion
and expressed that he thought the majority's and Justice White's opinions were "skewed" by the
"allure of absolute principles." Id. at 417 (Stevens, J., concurring). See generally Jonathan M.
Holdowsky, Note, Out of the Ashes of the Cross: The Legacy of R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 30 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 1115, 1135-36 (1996) (asserting that Justice White's concurrence read more like a
dissent because Justice White "sharply rebuked the majority's rationale" and rejected the theory
that fighting words "serve[d] as a mode of expression").
217. Compare State v. Sheldon, 629 A.2d 753, 763 (Md. 1993), and State v. Ramsey, 430
S.E.2d 511, 514 (S.C. 1993) (striking down statutes that prohibit cross burning as content-based
regulation), with State v. T.B.D., 656 So. 2d 479, 482 (Fla. 1995), and In re Steven S., 25 Cal.
App. 4th 598, 612-13 (Ct. App. 1994) (finding that cross burning statutes were constitutional
because they were sufficiently content-neutral). See generally Barlow, supra note 188, at 502-08
(analyzing the California cross burning statute under the existing First Amendment
jurisprudence).
218. See supra note 217 (noting state court decisions examining cross burning statutes).
219. E.g., Barlow, supra note 188, at 505 (scrutinizing the California cross burning statute,
noting that "[t]he State's concern with the prevention of terrorism only blossoms when a religious
symbol is treated in such a manner as to convey a particular message"); see supra note 217 (citing
decisions addressing cross burning statutes); see also Andrea L. Crowley, Note, R.A.V. v. St.
Paul: How the Supreme Court Missed the Writing on the Wall, 34 B.C. L. REV. 771, 797 (1993)
(providing a critical analysis of R.A. V.v. City of St. Paul, arguing that the Court ignored St.
Paul's compelling interest of preventing hate crimes, and contending that in striking the St. Paul
ordinance, the Supreme Court abandoned its First Amendment jurisprudence and held that
fighting words were constitutionally protected).
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constitutionality of cross burning would again come before the Supreme
Court for a more precise conclusion.220
III. DISCUSSION
In Virginia v. Black, the United States Supreme Court faced another
challenge regarding the constitutionality of a statutory prohibition
against cross burning.221  The Supreme Court of Virginia had
consolidated three cases that challenged convictions received under the
cross burning statute of Virginia.222  At issue was whether this statute
was a constitutional regulation of speech under First Amendment
jurisprudence. 223
Trial courts convicted Barry Black as well as Richard Elliott and
Jonathan O'Mara for violating the Virginia statute. 224  The Appellate
Court of Virginia upheld each of these convictions, and each defendant
appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia.225  Because the three men
each challenged the statute on similar constitutional grounds, the
Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated the three cases and held that the
statute was facially unconstitutional.226 After the Commonwealth of
Virginia successfully petitioned for certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court held, in a 6-3 decision, that the Virginia statute violated
the First Amendment. 22
7
220. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing the conflicting outcomes among
the states following R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul).
221. Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1541-42 (2003).
222. Id. at 1543. Black, Elliott, and O'Mara were contesting their convictions on the ground
that the Virginia statute was unconstitutional. Id.
223. Id. at 1541; see also id. at 1547-48 (explaining areas of speech in which the Supreme
Court has permitted regulation). Cross burning is symbolic expression, and the reason why
individuals burn crosses instead of employing other methods of communication is that cross
burning carries a particular message "in an effective and dramatic manner." Id. at 1548.
224. Id. at 1541.
225. Id. at 1543.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1552. Justice Stevens wrote a brief concurring opinion. See infra Part III.D.2
(discussing Justice Stevens' concurring opinion). Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion.
See infra Part IlI.D.3 (discussing Justice Thomas' concurring opinion). Justices Scalia and Souter
both wrote separate opinions in which they concurred and dissented in part. See infra Part
III.D.4-5 (discussing these opinions). Justice Thomas partially joined Justice Scalia's opinion.
Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1552 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justices Kennedy
and Ginsberg joined in Justice Souter's opinion. Id. at 1559 (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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A. Facts
Section 18.2-423 of the Virginia Code prohibited cross burning with
the intent to intimidate. 228  The statute did not define intent to
intimidate, 229 but it did provide that any cross burning is prima facie
evidence of intent to intimidate. 230  Thus, due to this prima facie
evidence provision, the Commonwealth proved its case so long as the
defense did not rebut the prima facie evidence. 231 Any person who
violated the statute was guilty of a Class 6 felony.232 The defendants of
the three consolidated cases that reached the United States Supreme
Court in Virginia v. Black all challenged the constitutionality of this
statute.
233
In August of 1998, Barry Black led a Klan rally in Virginia that
twenty-five to thirty people attended.234 The gathering occurred on
private property with permission from the property owner. 235 The town
sheriff observed the rally from the side of the road for approximately an
hour.236 Another witness, who was related to the property owner, also
viewed the rally. 237 This witness heard the rally and the Klan members'
profession of their beliefs, including derogatory statements about non-
Caucasian races. 238 At the conclusion of the rally, the attendees circled
a twenty-five- to thirty-foot cross that was between 300 and 350 yards
away from the road.239 The sheriff stated that the cross suddenly burst
into flames.240 The sheriff then learned that Black was responsible for
burning the cross and, consequently, arrested him pursuant to the
Virginia law.24 1
228. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1996).
229. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (discussing the Virginia statute).
230. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (discussing the Virginia statute). See
generally supra note 14 (defining prima facie evidence).
231. Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1530, 1553-54 (2003); see supra note 14 (defining prima
facie evidence).
232. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423.
233. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1543.
234. Id. at 1542.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. In Black's trial, the judge instructed the jury: "The burning of a cross, by itself, is
sufficient evidence from which you may infer the required intent." Id.; see VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-423 (Michie 1996) (outlawing cross burning with intent to intimidate).
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In May of 1998, Richard Elliott and Jonathan O'Mara attempted to
burn a cross in the yard of Elliott's next-door neighbor, James Jubilee,
an African American.242 Their alleged intention was to "get back" at
Jubilee for complaining about their habit of using Elliott's backyard as a
shooting range. 243  When Jubilee and his family had moved into the
neighborhood approximately four months prior to the incident, Jubilee
asked Elliott's mother about gun shots he had heard coming from
Elliott's backyard. 24 Jubilee testified that he was very scared when he
saw the partially burned cross in his yard and feared what might follow
the incident. 245 Both Elliott and O'Mara were charged with attempted
cross burning and conspiracy to commit cross burning in violation of
Virginia's cross burning statute.246
B. The Trial Court's Decision
The Commonwealth of Virginia charged Black with burning a cross
with the intent to intimidate in violation of Virginia Code § 18.2-423.247
The trial judge defined the intent to intimidate to the jury.248 The judge
also instructed the jury that the act of burning a cross alone was
sufficient evidence from which it might infer the intent required in the
statute. 249 The jury found Black guilty, and the court of appeals later
affirmed his conviction. 250
At his trial, O'Mara pleaded guilty to both counts, yet reserved the
right to challenge the constitutionality of the Virginia statute.251 At
Elliott's trial, the trial judge instructed the jury that the Commonwealth
must prove that the defendant intended to commit a cross burning and
that the defendant engaged in an affirmative act toward the commission
242. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1542-43.
243. Id. at 1543.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. In Elliott's trial, the judge instructed the jury "that the Commonwealth must prove
that 'the defendant intended to commit cross burning,' that 'the defendant intended to commit a
direct act toward the commission of the cross burning,' and that 'the defendant had the intent of
intimidating any person or group of persons."' Id. Since O'Mara pleaded guilty, there was no
issue as to the jury instructions given. See id. (illustrating O'Mara's guilty plea and his
reservation to challenge the constitutionality of the cross burning statute).
247. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1996) (outlawing cross burning with
intent to intimidate); supra note 11 (setting forth the commands of the statute).
248. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1542. The "intent to intimidate means the motivation to intentionally
put a person or a group of persons in fear of bodily harm." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1543.
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of the cross burning.252  The judge further instructed the jury that the
Commonwealth must prove that the defendant possessed the intent to
intimidate in the act of the cross burning. 253  The judge, however, did
not instruct the jury on the meaning of intimidation. 254 The jury found
Elliott guilty of the attempted cross burning and acquitted him of
conspiracy to commit a cross burning.255  The Virginia Court of
Appeals affirmed the convictions of both Elliott and O'Mara.256
C. The Supreme Court of Virginia Decision
All respondents, Black, Elliott, and O'Mara, appealed to the Supreme
Court of Virginia on the ground that § 18.2-423 was facially
unconstitutional and violated the First Amendment's protection of free
speech.257 The Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated all three cases
and agreed with the respondents, holding that § 18.2-423 was facially
unconstitutional. 258 The court analogized the Virginia statute to the
Minnesota statute deemed unconstitutional in R.A. V. v. St. Paul. 259 As a
result, the court held that the Virginia statute was content-based because
it prohibited cross burning due to its particular message. 260 Further, the
court held that the prima facie evidence provision rendered the statute
overbroad because it enabled the Commonwealth to secure convictions
more easily under the statute, chilling protected speech. 261
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.; see O'Mara v. Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 175, 179 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (explaining
that the Virginia statute prevents conduct that could be considered both a true threat as well as
fighting words).
257. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1543; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1996).
258. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1543. Facially unconstitutional means that the statute is completely
unconstitutional, or that, as a whole, the statute is unconstitutional. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
223 (7th ed. 1999).
259. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1543; see supra Part I.H (discussing the Court's holding in R.A.V.).
260. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1543. Respondents expanded on this idea in their .brief to the
Supreme Court by claiming that targeting a specific symbol, such as the cross, and a specific
ritual, such as burning a cross, discriminates based on content. See Brief on Merits for
Respondents at 7, Black (No. 01-1107) (arguing that the Virginia cross burning law discriminates
on the basis of content and viewpoint).
261. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1543. In its brief, the Commonwealth claimed that the prima facie
evidence permitting an inference was permissible, explaining that
[a] statutory inference is constitutional if (i) the state retains the burden of proof on the
fact to be presumed, and (ii) "it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the
presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made
to depend."
Brief of Petitioner at 42 n.24, Black (No. 01-1107) (quoting Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1973)). The respondents addressed the claim that the prima facie evidence
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Three Justices dissented, stating that the statute was constitutional
because it only proscribed true threats, not constitutionally protected
speech. 262  The dissent distinguished the Virginia statute from the
statute the United States Supreme Court had deemed unconstitutional in
the R.A.V. case. 263 Specifically, the dissent argued that the statute was
content-neutral because it applied to any individual burning a cross and
did not target cross burning based on race or ethnicity motivations. 264
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's analysis of the prima
facie evidence provision because the presumption alone was not
sufficient to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt burden to prove that
the defendant intended to intimidate someone by burning the cross. 265
Unhappy with the Virginia Supreme Court's decision, the state of
Virginia petitioned the United State Supreme Court for certiorari.266 On
May 28, 2002, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
hear the case. 267 Thus, after five years of litigation, the Supreme Court
definitively decided the fate of the Virginia cross burning statute,
ending the respondents' legal battle.
D. The United States Supreme Court Decision
In a plurality opinion, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia, holding that while
prohibiting cross burning with intent to intimidate is constitutional, the
prima facie evidence clause in the statute was not, rendering the entire
provision is unconstitutional by claiming that it enables "Virginia to obtain convictions through
shortcuts the First Amendment does not allow, and.., chills a range of constitutionally protected
expression, rendering it overbroad." Brief on Merits for Respondents at 5, Black (No. 01-1107).
262. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1543; Black v. Virginia, 553 S.E.2d 738, 753 (Va. 2001).
263. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1543.
264. Id.; Black, 553 S.E.2d at 753.
265. See Black, 553 S.E.2d at 795.
266. Black, 553 S.E.2d 738, petition for cert. filed, 2002 WL 32135594 (U.S. Jan. 24, 2002)
(No. 01-1107).
267. Virginia v. Black, 122 S. Ct. 2288 (2002). The Court also noted that after it granted
certiorari, Virginia attempted to remedy the constitutional problems of its statute by banning the
"burning of 'an object' when done with the intent of intimidating any person or group of
persons." Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1544 n.l. This revision does not contain a "prima facie evidence
provision [and] did not repeal the cross burning statute" that was challenged in this case. Id.
(citations omitted). For a critical analysis of the Virginia Supreme Court decision, see Mark S.
Enslin, Note, Domestic Terrorism or Protected Free Speech: The Supreme Court Decides the
Cross-burning Question in Black v. Virginia, 553 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001), 26 HAMLINE L. REV.
178 (2002). Enslin accurately predicted that the United States Supreme Court would declare the
Virginia statute to be different from the ordinance declared unconstitutional in R.A.V. Id. at 210.
For an interesting synopsis of the oral arguments before the Supreme Court in this case, see
Dahlia Lithwick, Personal Truths and Legal Fictions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002, at A35,
available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File.
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statute facially invalid.268  This section will examine the plurality
opinion and its First Amendment analysis. 269  Next, this section will
examine the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens. 270 This section then
will discuss Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion.271  Finally, this
section will discuss Justice Scalia's 272 and Justice Souter's concurring
and dissenting opinions.273
1. The Plurality Opinion
Justice O'Connor wrote the plurality opinion for the case. 274  Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, and Justice Breyer joined in this
opinion. 275 The Court began its discussion of the case by highlighting
First Amendment jurisprudence. 276  The Court explained that the First
Amendment operates as both a protection for the individual and a
prohibition against the state.277  The Court then acknowledged that the
right to freedom of speech is not absolute. 278  For example, the Court
noted that the First Amendment does not preclude a state from
regulating speech that has little to no social value; a state may prohibit
fighting words. 279  Moreover, the First Amendment allows a state to
prohibit true threats. 280
268. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1552 (plurality opinion). Note that the Court affirmed the decision of
the Supreme Court of Virginia with respect to Barry Black and vacated the Virginia Supreme
Court's decision with respect to Elliott and O'Mara and remanded for further proceedings. Id.
(plurality opinion).
269. See infra Part IlI.D. 1 (outlining the plurality opinion).
270. See infra Part III.D.2 (discussing Justice Stevens's concurrence).
271. See infra Part IlI.D.3 (discussing Justice Thomas's dissent).
272. See infra Part III.D.4 (discussing Justice Scalia's concurring and dissenting opinion).
273. See infra Part III.D.5 (discussing Justice Souter's concurring and dissenting opinion).
274. Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1541-52 (2003) (plurality opinion). A plurality
opinion is an opinion that receives more votes than any other, yet does not have enough votes to
constitute a majority. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1119 (7th ed. 1999).
275. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1541 (plurality opinion).
276. Id. at 1547 (plurality opinion).
277. Id. (plurality opinion). The First Amendment also protects some expressive conduct.
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (discussing cross burning as protected
expressive conduct); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405-06 (1989) (discussing flag burning as
protected expressive conduct); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505
(1969) (discussing wearing of armbands as protected expressive conduct); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (discussing burning registration certificates as protected
expressive conduct).
278. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1547 (plurality opinion). See generally supra Part II.D (tracing First
Amendment jurisprudence).
279. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1547 (plurality opinion). See generally supra Part II.D.3 (presenting
the fighting words doctrine).
280. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1547 (plurality opinion); see supra Part ll.D.2 (explaining the
government's compelling interest in prohibiting true threats).
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The Court then analyzed the decision of the Supreme Court of
Virginia.281 The Supreme Court recognized that cross burning is a form
of symbolic expression because a burning cross represents the speaker's
desired message in a remarkable manner.282 However, the Court
acknowledged that this conclusion was not dispositive of the outcome in
this case because the Court still had to evaluate the rationale for the
statute.283  The United States Supreme Court then disagreed with the
Supreme Court of Virginia's holding that the statute was
unconstitutional solely because it discriminated on the basis of
content. 284  The plurality reasoned that under R.A.V. not all content-
based prohibitions are unconstitutional. 285 Upon review, the Court
reiterated that its R.A. V. opinion did not hold that the First Amendment
prohibits all forms of content-based discrimination. 286 Rather, there are
certain circumstances in which content-based discrimination is
constitutional: namely, prohibitions against an entire class of speech
such as obscenity. 287
The Supreme Court then differentiated the Virginia statute from the
unconstitutional statute at issue in R.A. V.2 88  The Virginia statute did
not single out speech that fell into a disfavored category, whereas the
R.A.V. statute focused on cross burners seeking to intimidate particular
281. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1548 (plurality opinion). See generally supra Part Ill.C (outlining
the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia).
282. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1548 (plurality opinion). See generally supra Part II.E (describing
symbolic speech).
283. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1548 (plurality opinion).
284. Id. (plurality opinion).
285. Id. at 1549 (plurality opinion). The Supreme Court of Virginia relied on the holding in
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul. Id. at 1548 (plurality opinion); see supra notes 259-60 and
accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court of Virginia's analogy to the statute in R.A. V.);
see also supra Part II.C.I (discussing the distinction between content-based and content-neutral
statutes and this distinction's significance in First Amendment analysis).
286. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1549 (plurality opinion). Content-based statutes are unconstitutional
only when a danger of viewpoint discrimination exists. Id. (plurality opinion); see Members of
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (describing how the Supreme
Court has defined viewpoint discrimination, explaining, "The general principle that has
emerged.., is that the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that
favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others."). For a more detailed look at content-
based regulations of speech after R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, see Elena Kagan, Regulation of Hate
Speech and Pornography After R.A.V., 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 873 (1993).
287. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1549 (plurality opinion); see supra Part II.H (discussing the holding
in R.A. V.); supra Part I.C. I (discussing the distinction between content-based and content-neutral
statutes and this distinction's significance in First Amendment analysis).
288. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1549 (plurality opinion). See generally supra notes 198-200, 209-
12 (describing the statute at issue in R.A.V.).
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groups. 289 Instead, the Virginia statute applied to all who might bum a
cross with the intent of intimidation, regardless of the cross burner's
motivation. 290 The Court noted that not all cross burning is directed at
an individual or group because of his race or religious affiliation, and
the Virginia statute forbade cross burning with the intent to intimidate
anyone.291  The Court found that the Virginia statute fell into the
"particularly virulent" exception from R.A.V., concluding that the
statute was content-based without providing extensive discussion.292
Therefore, because the Virginia statute and the statute from R.A.V.
greatly differed, the Court held that finding the Virginia statute
unconstitutional was consistent with its holding in R.A. V.2 93
The Court continued by scrutinizing the holding of the Supreme
Court of Virginia and the Virginia court's rationale for declaring the
Virginia statute unconstitutional.294 The Court noted that the Supreme
Court of Virginia did not evaluate the prima facie evidence provision.295
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the respondents argued
that the evidentiary provision was facially unconstitutional. 296  The
Supreme Court looked at the prima facie evidence provision as applied
to each of the defendants in the case, noting that each defendant
received a slightly different instruction. 297 The Court concluded that
289. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1549 (plurality opinion); see supra Part II.H (describing the Court's
holding regarding the St. Paul ordinance it found unconstitutional in R.A. V.).
290. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1549 (plurality opinion).
291. Id. (plurality opinion). The court also noted that there was no clear indication of racial
animus in the cross burnings of the Elliott and O'Mara cases. Id. (plurality opinion).
292. Id. (plurality opinion). Because of "cross burning's long and pernicious history as a
signal of impending violence," the Court stated Virginia could choose to legislate specifically
against that particular form of intimidation,. Id. (plurality opinion).
293. Id. at 1549-50 (plurality opinion).
294. Id. at 1550 (plurality opinion); see supra notes 258-61 and accompanying text (detailing
the rationale of the Virginia Supreme Court as based on a determination that the Virginia statute
was content-based, much like the St. Paul ordinance in R.A.V., and that the prima facie evidence
provision rendered the statute overbroad).
295. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1543 (plurality opinion); see supra note 265 and accompanying text
(noting the dissent's criticism of the majority's analysis of the prima facie evidence provision).
296. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1550 (plurality opinion). This was the same argument the
respondents made to the Supreme Court of Virginia. Id. (plurality opinion). See generally supra
note 258 and accompanying text (defining facially unconstitutional).
297. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1550 (plurality opinion). In O'Mara's case, the instruction was not
at issue because he pleaded guilty. Id. In Elliott's case, the jury did not receive an instruction on
the evidence provision. Id. In Black's case, the court instructed the jury that the provision meant
that the burning of the cross alone was sufficient evidence from which the jurors might "infer the
required intent." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
2004] Burned Out 1089
the prima facie evidence provision as defined by the differing jury
instructions rendered the statute unconstitutional.298
The Court explained that the construal of the prima facie provision in
the jury instructions given in Black's trial took away the basis upon
which the Commonwealth could ban cross burning in the context of
intimidation. 299  The provision permitted a jury to convict any
defendant of cross burning if he exercised his constitutional right not to
put forth a defense. 30 0  Further, the Court explained that the provision
would make conviction more likely, regardless of the facts of the
particular case, because it allowed a finding of intimidation without
substantial proof.30 1 The Court then concluded that this interpretation
of the evidence provision unconstitutionally would suppress ideas by
blurring the line between cross burning for expression and cross burning
to threaten. 30 2
Because of this distortion, the provision chilled free speech.30 3 The
Court recognized that a burning cross is not always intended to
intimidate and that often it has been a symbol of group ideology and
solidarity.304 Further, sometimes the burning cross does not represent
intimidation or a statement of ideology. 30 5 The Court again emphasized
298. Id. (plurality opinion). See generally supra notes 241, 246 (discussing the jury
instructions given in Black's and Elliott's trials).
299. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1550 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor wrote, "As construed by
the jury instruction, the prima facie provision strips away the very reason why a State may ban
cross burning with the intent to intimidate." Id. (plurality opinion); see supra notes 241, 246
(discussing the jury instructions given in Black's and Elliott's trials).
300. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1550 (plurality opinion); see supra note 248 (discussing the Virginia
statute as applied in Black's case).
301. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1550 (plurality opinion). The jury will be more apt to find
intimidation even if the defendant does set forth a defense. Id. (plurality opinion). "The
provision permits the Commonwealth to arrest, prosecute, and convict a person based solely on
the fact of cross burning itself." Id. at 1550-51 (plurality opinion).
302. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1551 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor stated that the provision
"would create an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas." Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting
Sec'y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 965 n. 13 (internal quotations omitted)).
303. Id. (plurality opinion). The provision chills speech "because of the possibility that a
State will prosecute-and potentially convict-somebody engaging only in lawful political
speech at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect." Id. (plurality opinion)
(emphasis added). But see infra Part II.D.3 (discussing Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion and
his conclusion that no cross burning can be construed as expression).
304. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1551 (plurality opinion). The Court referred to the burning of a cross
at Klan meetings and the burning cross as a representation of the Klan itself. Id. (plurality
opinion). See generally supra Part I.G (discussing the history of cross burning).
305. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1551 (plurality opinion). The Court referred to the use of a burning
cross in the movie Mississippi Burning and in the stage adaptation of Sir Walter Scott's The Lady
of the Lake. Id. (plurality opinion).
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that the statute failed to differentiate between the possible meanings and
intentions behind the burning of a cross.
306
While the Court acknowledged that cross burning may invoke
particular feelings of anger or hatred among those people who see a
burning cross, it deemed this hatred insufficient to ban all cross
burnings. 307 The Court held that because of the nature of the prima
facie evidence provision's interpretation and application in Black's
case, the prima facie evidence provision was facially
unconstitutional. 308 It refused to speculate as to whether there would be
any interpretation of the provision that would be consistent with the
First Amendment because the Supreme Court of Virginia had yet to
make an authoritative interpretation of the provision. 30 9 However, the
Court recognized the possibility of an interpretation that would comply
with the Constitution. 310 Because the Court held that the prima facie
evidence rendered the Virginia statute unconstitutional, the Court
affirmed the reversal of Black's conviction and vacated and remanded
with respect to Elliott and O'Mara. 311 A possibility remained for the
Commonwealth to try Elliott's and O'Mara's cases under the newly
formulated law because the Supreme Court left open the possibility of
the legislature severing the prima facie evidence provision.312
306. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1551 (plurality opinion). The prima facie evidence provision "allows
a jury to treat a cross burning on the property of another with the owner's acquiescence in the
same manner as a cross burning on the property of another without the owner's permission." Id.
(plurality opinion); see supra notes 228-33 (discussing the Virginia statute as applied in Black's,
Elliott's, and O'Mara's cases).
307. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1551 (plurality opinion). "The prima facie evidence provision...
ignores all of the contextual factors that are necessary to decide whether a particular cross burning
is intended to intimidate. The First Amendment does not permit such a shortcut." Id.
308. Id. at 1551-52 (plurality opinion). For information on the effect of giving an erroneous
jury instruction relating to the burden of proof and presumptions, see David B. Sweet,
Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to Prejudicial Effect in Criminal Case of Erroneous
Instructions to Jury Involving Burden of Proof or Presumptions, 92 L. ED. 2D 862 (2003).
309. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1552 (plurality opinion). The Supreme Court did note that the
Virginia Supreme Court stated that "the act of burning a cross alone, with no evidence of intent to
intimidate, will nonetheless suffice for arrest and prosecution and will insulate the
Commonwealth from a motion to strike the evidence at the end of its case-in-chief." Id. at 1550
(plurality opinion) (internal quotations omitted); see infra notes 349-52 (noting Justice Scalia's
discussion of how the Commonwealth of Virginia defines prima facie evidence).
310. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1552 (plurality opinion). "We also recognize the theoretical
possibility that the court, on remand, could interpret the provision in a manner different from that
set forth in order to avoid the constitutional objections we have described." Id. (plurality
opinion).
311. Id. (plurality opinion).
312. Id. (plurality opinion). On remand, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed its prior
holding and reiterated its declaration that the prima facie evidence provision rendered the statute
overbroad. See Elliott v. Virginia, 593 S.E.2d 263, 266 (Va. 2004) (holding that "the instruction
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2. Justice Stevens's Concurrence
Justice Stevens agreed with the plurality, yet wrote separately to
emphasize what he viewed as most significant to the decision. 313  He
explained that Virginia's prohibition on intentionally intimidating cross
burning fell into the category of an unprotected threat.314  Justice
Stevens urged that this was sufficient basis for upholding the
prohibition against cross burning in the statute even without covering
other types of conduct.315 Justice Stevens stated that prohibiting cross
burning as a threat not protected by the First Amendment was sufficient
in itself to uphold the Virginia statute's prohibition against cross
burning with intent to intimidate. 316
3. Justice Thomas's Dissent
Justice Thomas began his dissent by acknowledging that people
attribute a special meaning to certain things and that these special
meanings can include both the sacred and the profane. 317 He described
cross burning as an example of profanity.3 18 While Justice Thomas
agreed with the majority's conclusion that the Constitution permits a
ban on cross burning with intent to intimidate, he disagreed that one
could find any expressive element in the endeavor. 319 Because the
Virginia statute banned only intimidating conduct, Justice Thomas
given at Black's trial properly interprets the prima facie evidence provision of' the Virginia
statute). The Supreme Court of Virginia also held that the prima facie evidence provision was
severable. Id. at 268. The Virginia court concluded that while the prima facie evidence provision
was unconstitutional, it was severable, and "the core provisions of the statute that remain do not
violate the First Amendment" or the Virginia Constitution. Id. at 270.
313. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1552 (Stevens, J., concurring).
314. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Cross burning with "'an intent to intimidate'
unquestionably qualifies as the kind of threat that is unprotected by the First Amendment." Id.
(Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted); see supra Part II.D.2 (discussing the government's
compelling interest in prohibiting true threats).
315. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1552 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens referred to the
separate opinions that he and Justice White wrote in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul. Id.; see R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 397 (1992) (White, J., concurring); RAY, 505 U.S. at 416
(Stevens, J., concurring). In their concurrences in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Justice Stevens and
Justice White advocated that the Court's approach was an abandonment of the First Amendment
jurisprudence that allowed the state to prohibit expressive activity that had little or no worth to
society. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 400 (White, J., concurring); id. at 417 (Stevens, J., concurring).
316. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1552 (Stevens, J., concurring).
317. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1562 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas noted that the
American flag has a sacred meaning. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
318. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). "In every culture, certain things acquire meaning well
beyond what outsiders can comprehend .... I believe that cross burning is the paradigmatic
example of' profanity. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
319. Id. at 1563 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See generally supra Part II.E (discussing symbolic
speech).
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argued that the Virginia legislature eliminated any expressive quality
that cross burning may have by explicitly writing "with intent to
intimidate." 320  Thus, he contended that the plurality ignored reality
when it concluded that the statute swept beyond prohibition of conduct
to regulation of expression. 321
Next, Justice Thomas emphasized the historical connection between
the Klan and violent activity, referring to the Klan as a terrorist
organization. 322 He explained that the Klan often uses brutal methods
to intimidate those groups that it dislikes. 323  One brutal method of
intimidation that the Klan uses is cross burning.324  Furthermore, he
stated that more violence, such as beatings and murders, often follows a
cross burning. 325 Justice Thomas also noted that the perception of a
burning cross as a threat of impending violence is not unique to African
Americans. 326 He maintained that cross burning has been synonymous
with mayhem. 327
Justice Thomas then recognized that Virginia has an extensive history
with the Ku Klux Klan. 328  Because Virginia participated in
320. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1563 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
321. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas explained that it "overlooks not only the
words of the statute but also reality." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
322. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas cited to the fact that the Klan "members
remain fanatically committed to a course of violent opposition to social progress and racial
equality in the United States." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting M. NEWTON & J. NEWTON,
THE KU KLUX KLAN: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, at vii (1991)).
323. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
324. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting); see supra Part II.G (discussing the history of cross burning).
325. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1563 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas cites a district court's
recognition of the effect cross burning can have on individuals. Id. at 1564 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Thomas quoted:
"After the mother saw the burning cross, she was crying on her knees in the living
room. [She] felt feelings of frustration and intimidation and feared for her husband's
life. She testified what the burning cross symbolized to her as a black American:
'murder, hanging, rape, lynching. Just about anything bad that you can name. It is the
worst thing that can happen to a person.' Mr. Heisser told the probation officer that at
the time of the occurrence, if the family did not leave, he believed someone would
return to commit murder .... Seven months after the accident, the family still lived in
fear... This is a reaction reasonably to be anticipated from this criminal conduct."
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Skillman, 922 F.2d 1370, 1378 (9th Cir.
1991)).
326. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
327. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas explained, "In our culture, cross burning has
almost invariably meant lawlessness and understandably instills in its victims well-grounded fear
of physical violence." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
328. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1564-65 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas cited to several
newspaper articles that described the incidents of cross burning as the Klan's intimidating acts.
See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). In 1952, as a result of continual problems with the Klan burning
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segregationist practices at the time it enacted legislation that prohibited
cross burning, Justice Thomas argued that the Virginia legislature
intended to penalize the offensive conduct only. 329  He therefore
concluded that the Virginia statute only prohibited the physical activity
of burning a cross with the intent to intimidate and did not prohibit any
protected expression. 330 Because he concluded that the Virginia statute
only regulated conduct, Justice Thomas thus decided that the Court did
not need to analyze the statute under any established First Amendment
tests. 3
31
Justice Thomas then argued that even if the statute applied to
protected speech and not mere conduct, the statute did not violate the
First Amendment. 332  He contended that, contrary to the plurality's
opinion, the statute's grant of permission to a jury to infer intent solely
from the act of the cross burning did not create a constitutional
problem.333 To justify why he believed that the prima facie evidence
provision was constitutional, Justice Thomas then explained the nature
of the presumption at issue and stressed its importance. 334 He pointed
out that the Virginia Supreme Court had labeled the prima facie
evidence provision as an inference and not a true presumption. 335
crosses to intimidate, Virginia's governor sought to pass legislation banning cross burning. Id. at
1565 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
329. Id. at 1565-66 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas noted that while Virginia did
participate in segregation of the races during the time the legislature enacted legislation banning
cross burning, "[t]he ban on cross burning with intent to intimidate demonstrates that even
segregationists understood the difference between intimidating and terroristic conduct and racist
expression." Id. at 1566 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He explained that it was "simply beyond belief
that, in passing the statute now under review, the Virginia legislature was concerned with
anything but penalizing conduct it must have viewed as particularly vicious." Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
330. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). See generally supra Part I.E (discussing symbolic speech
protected by the First Amendment).
331. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1566 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
332. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
333. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
334. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). He quoted: "'The threshold inquiry in ascertaining the
constitutional analysis applicable to [a jury instruction involving a presumption] is to determine
the nature of the presumption it describes."' Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 (1985)). A presumption is a special device for shifting and allocating
burdens. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE
RULES 772 (2000) (explaining the different types of presumptions and the effects that each
particular presumption has on evidence). Justice Thomas explained that "an inference, sometimes
loosely referred to as a presumption of fact, does not compel a specific conclusion. An inference
merely applies to the rational potency or probative value of an evidentiary fact to which the fact
finder may attach whatever force or weight it deems best." Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1566 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); see supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text (discussing the prima facie evidence
provision as it affected the jury instructions in Black's and Elliott's trials).
335. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1566 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Under Virginia law, an inference differs from a presumption.336 Justice
Thomas explained that a presumption shifts the burden of producing
evidence to the opposing party, who then must rebut the presumption,
whereas an inference does not require the jury to reach a certain
result.337 Although the Virginia Supreme Court had labeled the prima
facie provision as an inference, Justice Thomas argued that the United
States Supreme Court still must examine whether precedent justified
labeling the provision as an inference and that in fact it did.338 Justice
Thomas thus contended that the Supreme Court should analyze the
Virginia statute based on the constitutional analysis pertinent to
inferences. 339
Justice Thomas also noted that the Supreme Court previously had not
used a strict level of scrutiny for mandatory irrebuttable presumptions
regarding intent.340 He explained that some acts, such as cross burning,
are so blameworthy that a high scrutiny level is inappropriate; in fact,
the government should not even have to prove intent, he argued.
341
Justice Thomas concluded that because the prima facie clause at issue
336. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Martin v. Phillips, 369 S.E.2d 397, 399 (Va. 1988)).
Justice Thomas defined a presumption as "a rule of law that compels the fact finder to draw a
certain conclusion or a certain inference from a given set of facts," whereas an inference does not
require a specific conclusion. Id. at 1566-67 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
337. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1567 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas explained that "[n]o
presumption... can operate to shift the ultimate burden of persuasion from the party upon whom
it was originally cast." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
338. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). He explained that "it is crucial to observe that what Virginia
law calls an 'inference' is what our cases have termed 'a permissive inference or presumption."'
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). See generally supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text
(discussing the prima facie evidence provision as it affected the jury instructions in Black's and
Elliott's trials).
339. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1567 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Court should use the standard
that the statute should raise "no constitutional flags unless 'no rational trier could make a
connection permitted by the inference."' Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting County Court of
Ulster City v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979)).
340. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
341. Justice Thomas described statutory rape as having no scienter requirement. Id. at 1567
(Thomas, J., dissenting). "[A] person can be arrested, prosecuted, and convicted for having sex
with a minor, without the government ever producing any evidence, let alone proving beyond a
reasonable doubt, that a minor did not consent." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Because
legislatures have found statutory rape to be a reprehensible crime, "the intent is satisfied by the
mere act committed by a perpetrator. Considering the horrific effect cross burning has on its
victims, it is also reasonable to presume intent to intimidate from the act itself." Id. at 1568
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also used the example of statutes prohibiting drug
possession with intent to distribute to show that there are other situations in which the legislatures
constitutionally may establish irrebuttable presumptions with regard to the defendant's intent. Id.
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
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was an inference, there was basis to sustain it under constitutional
precedent. 342
Justice Thomas then addressed the First Amendment concerns that
the plurality had expressed. 343 In response to the plurality's concern
that the statute chills expression by permitting the arrest, prosecution,
and conviction of a person solely based on the cross burning itself, he
first argued that it was unclear whether the inference affected the arrest
or the initiation of prosecution. 344 Then, Justice Thomas explained that
the presumption was rebuttable. 345  Finally, he contended that the
statutory presumption did not chill expression because no conviction
occurred unless the jury found each element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.346  Although Justice Thomas vehemently disagreed
with the plurality that the Virginia statute prohibited expression, even
conceding that the statute warranted First Amendment analysis, he
found that it complied with the First Amendment due to the inferential
quality of the prima facie evidence provision, and therefore he argued
that the statute was constitutional.347
4. Justice Scalia's Partial Concurrence and Dissent
Justice Scalia agreed with the Court's finding that the basic
prohibition of the Virginia statute was in accordance with the R.A. V. v.
St. Paul holding; 348 however, he disagreed with the Court's general
interpretation of the Virginia statute. 349 Justice Scalia saw it important
not only to define prima facie evidence, but also to clarify the meaning
that the Commonwealth of Virginia gave prima facie evidence. 350 He
342. Id. at 1568 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
343. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
344. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
345. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
346. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Further, Justice Thomas observed that the Supreme Court
has upheld regulations "where conduct that initially appears culpable, ultimately results in
dismissed charges." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). He cited regulation of pornography as an
example of such. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas explained that the "chilling"
effect on free speech has not "been a cause for grave concern with respect to overbreadth of such
statutes among the members of this Court." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
347. Id. at 1566 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
348. Id. at 1552 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra notes 288-93
and accompanying text (explaining the plurality's rationale for finding the statute's prohibition
constitutional via one of R.A.WV's enumerated exceptions). See generally supra Part II.H
(discussing the Court's holding in R.A. V.).
349. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1552 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra
notes 299-306 and accompanying text (discussing the plurality's interpretation of the Virginia
statute).
350. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1552 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Scalia defined prima facie evidence as
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thus noted that Virginia used the conventional definition of prima facie
evidence.351  Justice Scalia stated that while Virginia was free to
interpret prima facie evidence in a nontraditional way or in different
ways in different statutes, Virginia had not done so.
352
Justice Scalia emphasized the Supreme Court of Virginia's lack of
suggestion that a jury may ignore rebuttal evidence against the prima
facie provision and further stated that the Virginia Supreme Court
distorted the meaning of the provision because the jury did not fully
coriprehend the provision's purpose. 353 He also pointed out that the
Supreme Court of Virginia interpreted the provision in a very limited
way, concluding that the provision meant that evidence that the accused
burned a cross is automatically enough to support an assumption of
intimidation. 354  Therefore, Justice Scalia interpreted the issue as
whether the Virginia statute was constitutional given the Supreme Court
of Virginia's definition of prima facie evidence. 355 Justice Scalia then
analyzed the overbreadth rationale the Virginia Supreme Court used to
declare the cross burning statute unconstitutional.356 Justice Scalia
[s]uch evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact...
and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient. [Such evidence], if
unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain a judgment in favor of the issue
which it supports, but [it] may be contradicted by other evidence.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quotations omitted) (quoting BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1190 (6th ed. 1990)).
351. Id. at 1553 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia cited to
several cases that show that Virginia uses the traditional definition of prima facie evidence. Id.
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see Babbitt v. Miller, 64 S.E.2d 718, 722
(Va. 1951) (defining prima facie evidence as that "which on its first appearance is sufficient to
raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless rebutted"). See generally supra
Part III.C (discussing the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia).
352. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1554 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Scalia cited the Supreme Court of Virginia's interpretation of the term in the prior history of the
case: "'[T]he act of burning a cross alone, with no evidence of intent to intimidate, will ...
suffice for arrest and prosecution and will insulate the Commonwealth from a motion to strike the
evidence at the end of its case-in-chief."' Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Black v. Virginia, 553 S.E.2d 738, 746 (Va. 2001)).
353. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra Part IH.C (discussing
the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia).
354. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1554 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Scalia explained that it was it crucial that the court did not say "that the presentation of prima
facie evidence is always sufficient to get a case to a jury." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). He explained that "presentation of evidence that a defendant burned a cross in
public view is automatically sufficient, on its own, to support an inference that the defendant
intended to intimidate only until the defendant comes forward with some evidence in rebuttal."
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
355. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
356. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally supra note 261
and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court of Virginia's overbreadth analysis).
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declared that the Virginia Supreme Court's approach to the overbreadth
analysis was unfounded because United States Supreme Court
precedent had never rendered a statute unconstitutional merely because
of the possibility of arrest and prosecution. 35
7
He clarified that the United States Supreme Court had focused on
whether a state may convict an individual, rather than whether a state
may arrest and prosecute. 358 He argued that the plurality correctly
focused on the question of conviction because the state may convict
some individuals who engage in protected speech.359  Justice Scalia
further agreed with the plurality that an individual may use cross
burning as a form of expression and that the state may not ban non-
intimidating cross burning.360  However, Justice Scalia explained that
the plurality made an irrational conclusion that the possibility of
conviction substantiated a facial invalidation of the statute based on the
overbreadth doctrine. 361  In looking at the statute's principal
prohibition, Justice Scalia found that it did not capture any protected
conduct. 362 He claimed that the plurality wrongly focused on the prima
facie evidence provision rather than the fundamental proscription of the
statute. 363 Justice Scalia explained that the plurality even conceded that
the only way that the state might be able to convict a person
successfully based solely on the prima facie evidence provision would
be if that person failed to present a defense. 364 He claimed that this
357. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1554 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Scalia explained that the Supreme Court has "never held that the mere threat that individuals that
engage in protected conduct will be subject to arrest and prosecution suffices to render a statute
overbroad." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
358. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia explained that the
overbreadth analysis has focused on the prohibitory terms of a statute. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
359. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
360. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally supra Part .E
(discussing symbolic speech).
361. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1554-55 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). With
regard to the overbreadth doctrine, Justice Scalia noted "that 'in a facial challenge to the
overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a court's first task is to determine whether the enactment
reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct."' Id. at 1555 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982)). See generally supra Part II.C.2 (discussing overbreadth
analysis).
362. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1555 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
363. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "In order to identify any
protected conduct .... the plurality is compelled to focus not on the statute's core prohibition,
but on the prima-facie-evidence provision, and hence on the process through which the prohibited
conduct may be found by a jury." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
364. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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weakened the plurality's argument and that the core provision of the
statute was limited to unprotected conduct--cross burning with the
intent to intimidate. 365
However, Justice Scalia did concede that, hypothetically, there is a
rare class of persons who burn a cross without intent to intimidate,
whom the state then prosecutes, and who fail to present a defense,
leading to an impermissible conviction. 366 He concluded, nevertheless,
that this hypothetical class of persons could not give rise to a facial
challenge, even with the assistance of the overbreadth doctrine, because
this class is not large enough to render the Virginia statute substantially
overbroad.367 Therefore, Justice Scalia contended that these potential
improper convictions did not call for a facial invalidation of the
statute.
368
Justice Scalia also found it troubling that the plurality based its
understanding of the prima facie evidence provision on varying jury
instructions because no precedent exists for facially invalidating an
ambiguous statute based on a jury instruction.369 Further, he advocated
that because the Virginia Supreme Court had interpreted the statute in
accordance with the traditional notion of prima facie evidence, it was
inappropriate for the plurality to invalidate the statute due to its prima
facie evidence provision.370 Justice Scalia found the plurality's
statement-that the Supreme Court of Virginia had not interpreted the
meaning of the prima facie evidence provision and therefore one could
interpret the statute in a manner that would be constitutional-
365. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
366. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "The class of persons that the
plurality contemplates could impermissibly be convicted.., includes only those individuals who
(1) burn a cross in public view, (2) do not intend to intimidate, (3) are nonetheless charged and
prosecuted, and (4) refuse to present a defense." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
367. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia clarified that the
statute's reach does not cause the statute to be unconstitutional unless its overbreadth is
substantial and real. Id. at 1555-56 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 (1990)).
368. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1556 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
generally supra note 258 (defining facially unconstitutional).
369. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1556-57 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
generally supra note 258 (defining facially unconstitutional); supra notes 299-302 and
accompanying text (analyzing the plurality's basis of understanding of the prima facie evidence
provision on jury instructions given in Black's trial). This lack of precedent did not surprise
Justice Scalia because treating jury instructions as binding would vest a large amount of power to
trial court judges. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1557 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
370. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1557-58 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
generally supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court of
Virginia's rationale for declaring the Virginia statute unconstitutional).
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particularly baffling. 371  He explained that if one could interpret the
statute in a constitutional way, then facial invalidation was clearly
inappropriate. 372
Although Justice Scalia believed that the prima facie evidence
provision was constitutional, he partially concurred with the plurality
decision373 because the Virginia Supreme Court had yet to interpret that
provision authoritatively. 374 However, Justice Scalia refused to concur
in the Court's decision to reverse Black's conviction because he
believed that the Virginia Supreme Court had made an erroneous
conclusion based on an irrational overbreadth analysis, believing that
the constitutional defect was in the jury instruction. 375
The plurality's facial invalidation troubled Justice Scalia because the
plurality had conceded that it based its comprehension of the prima
facie evidence provision on the jury instructions given in Black's
case.376 He argued that treating jury instructions as binding in an area
in which a state law is ambiguous would give too much power to trial
court judges because a specific judge's reading of a state statute could
cause its invalidation.377 Justice Scalia also found it troubling that the
legislature had not promulgated the jury instructions used in Black's
trial and that the Virginia Supreme Court had not adopted the
instructions officially, yet the plurality had taken the instructions to be
sufficiently binding to render the statute facially unconstitutional.378 In
addition, he argued that the plurality should have reached the opposite
result because of the doctrine that provides that when there are two
possible interpretations of a statute, one constitutional and the other not,
371. Id. at 1558 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally supra
notes 299-302 and accompanying text (discussing the plurality's understanding of the prima facie
evidence provision based on jury instructions given in Black's trial).
372. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1558 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "So, what
appears to have happened is that the plurality has facially invalidated... its own hypothetical
version of [the statute] and has remanded to the Virginia Supreme Court to learn the actual
interpretation of [the statute]. Words cannot express my wonderment at this virtuoso
performance." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
373. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1558 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Scalia agreed that the convictions of Elliott and O'Mara should be vacated and remanded and that
the conviction of Black could not stand. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
374. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra Part III.C (discussing
the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia).
375. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1558 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra
Part III.C (discussing the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia).
376. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1556 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra
note 241 (discussing the jury instructions given in Black's trial).
377. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1557 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
378. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the court should adopt the reading that renders the statute
constitutional. 379
Justice Scalia also found it incredible that the plurality facially
invalidated the Virginia statute, yet held out the possibility that the
Virginia Supreme Court could interpret the statute in a constitutional
way because it had declared the entire statute facially
unconstitutional. 380 He accused the plurality of invalidating its own
version of the Virginia statute while remanding the issue to the Virginia
Supreme Court to discover the actual interpretation. 381  Thus, Justice
Scalia agreed that the plurality correctly upheld a state's ability to ban
cross burning with the intent to intimidate, yet disagreed as to the means
the plurality had taken to declare the Virginia statute facially invalid.
5. Justice Souter's Partial Concurrence and Dissent
Justice Souter agreed with the Court's finding that the Virginia
statute made a content-based distinction.382  Moreover, he agreed that
the constitutional problem with the statute lay in its prima facie
evidence provision. 383 Yet, he disagreed that the statute fell within one
of the exceptions from R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul that permit content-
based distinctions384 and explained that an understanding of the prima
facie evidence provision demonstrated why the statute did not fall into
one of the R.A. V. exceptions.385 Justice Souter argued that although the
379. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia referred to the
maxim "ut res magis valeat quam pereat." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). This maxim means that "when there are two possible interpretations, the one which gives
the [statute] proper effect should be applied." Leigh Ann Kennedy, Jurisdiction in Violation of
an Extradition Treaty: United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1105, 1119
(1994).
380. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1557 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
generally supra note 90 (contrasting facial challenges and as-applied challenges).
381. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1558 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
382. Id. at 1559 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This distinction is
"within the category of punishable intimidating or threatening expression." Id. (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
383. Id. at 1562 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Souter
explained that the "provision will thus tend to draw nonthreatening ideological expression within
the ambit of the prohibition of intimidating expression." Id. at 1561-62 (Souter, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
384. Id. at 1559 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally supra
Part II.C. 1 (discussing the distinction between content-based and content-neutral statutes and this
distinction's significance in First Amendment analysis); supra notes 205-08 and accompanying
text (discussing the R.A. V. exceptions).
385. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1560 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Souter discussed each of the RA.V. exceptions and found that the Virginia statute did not fit into
any exception. See id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Souter
explained:
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Virginia statute did not contain express categories of individuals who
might be affected by a cross burning as did the statute in R.A. V., a
burning cross is a symbol with an identifiable content, and therefore
regulations of cross burning are by their very nature content-based. 386
He therefore saw the issue before the Court as whether the Virginia
statute fell into one of the exceptions to the general prohibition of
content-based restrictions set forth in R.A. V. v. St. Paul.38 7
While the plurality held that the statute fit into the particularly
virulent exception, Justice Souter disagreed.388 This exception from
R.A. V. meant that a state could proscribe content if it based its
prohibition on the reason that the entire class of speech was
proscribable. 389 Justice Souter contended that the statute did not fit into
the particularly virulent category because he viewed the Virginia statute
as prohibiting a specific viewpoint.390 Further, creating additional
practical interpretations based on R.A. V. exceptions would not allow for
the survival of a statute that created a high probability of the
suppression of ideas. 39 1  Justice Souter argued that the prima facie
evidence provision created this high probability and therefore the statute
did not fall into an exception. 392
The majority's approach could be taken as recognizing an exception to RA.V. when
circumstances show that the statute's ostensibly valid reason for punishing particularly
serious proscribable expression probably is not a ruse for message suppression, even
though the statute may have a greater (but not exclusive) impact on adherents of one
ideology than on others.
Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
386. Id. at 1559 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Further, "even when the
symbolic act [of cross burning] is meant to terrify, a burning cross may carry a further,
ideological message of white Protestant supremacy." Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See generally supra Part II.E (discussing symbolic speech).
387. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1560 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Souter found that the RA.V. exception that the Court mostly likely would find applicable to the
Virginia statute was the "particularly virulent" proscribable expression exception. Id. (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally supra notes 205-08 and accompanying
text (discussing the exceptions that the Court set forth in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul).
388. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1559-60 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
supra note 292 and accompanying text (discussing the plurality's finding that the Virginia statute
fit into the particularly virulent exception); supra note 206 (explaining the particularly virulent
exception in R.A.V.).
389. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1560 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
390. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Souter read the R.A. V.
examples as covering those prohibitions that did not clearly associate with a particular viewpoint.
Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
391. Id. at 1561 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
392. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally supra Part II.H
(discussing the Court's holding in R.A. V. and its confusing precedent).
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Justice Souter viewed the evidentiary provision as a way to distort the
jury's deliberations toward a conviction, 393 thus persuading the jury to
err on the side of conviction. 394 He argued that this distortion was hard
to remedy 395 because it pulled protected symbolic speech within the
realm of the prohibition in the statute. 396 Justice Souter asserted that
because the statute skewed prosecutions, it would result in the
suppression of ideas. 397 He also found the R.A. V. exception into which
the majority placed the Virginia statute inapplicable because the statute
may suppress ideas. 398 Moreover, because he did not find the statute to
fit within an RA.V. exception, Justice Souter declared that the Court
should have used strict scrutiny to analyze the statute.399 Using strict
scrutiny analysis, he therefore concluded that the content-based statute
was invalid at the time all defendants were arrested and that severance
of the prima facie evidence provision would not save the statute.4°°
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court in Virginia v. Black incorrectly held that the
Virginia statute was unconstitutional. 40 1 However, the Court properly
noted that it is possible for a state to ban cross burning with intent to
intimidate in accordance with the Constitution.4° 2 This Part first argues
that the Court was incorrect in finding the Virginia statute
393. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1561 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). While
one can view the symbolic act of cross burning as a form of intimidation based on the
surrounding circumstances, Justice Souter argued that the jury always will be able to find some
sort of circumstance that substantiates intimidation. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See generally supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text (discussing the
prima facie evidence provision as it affected the jury instructions in Black's and Elliott's trials).
394. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1561 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
generally supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text (discussing the prima facie evidence
provision as it affected the jury instructions in Black's and Elliott's trials).
395. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1561 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
396. Id. at 1561-62 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally supra
Part II.E (discussing symbolic speech).
397. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1562 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
398. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
399. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The statute could "only survive
if narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
400. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally supra Part II.C. 1
(discussing the distinction between content-based and content-neutral statutes and this
distinction's significance in First Amendment analysis).
401. See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1552 (plurality opinion) (setting out the holding of the case).
402. Id. at 1550 (plurality opinion).
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unconstitutional because of its prima facie evidence provision.40 3 Next,
this Part contends that while the Court correctly noted that statutes may
ban cross burning with the intent to intimidate without violating the
Constitution, the Court reached this conclusion incorrectly. 40 4 This Part
then argues that statutes may prohibit cross burning with the intent to
intimidate without violating the First Amendment because such statutes
merely regulate conduct that has no expressive value.
405
A. The Court Incorrectly Found the Virginia Statute Unconstitutional
by Reason of Its Prima Facie Evidence Provision
The Supreme Court incorrectly held that the prima facie evidence
provision rendered the entire statute unconstitutional. 40 6  Even the
plurality recognized that it had not based its decision upon an
authoritative interpretation of the provision because the Supreme Court
of Virginia had yet to firmly clarify the meaning of the provision.
407
Generally, the United States Supreme Court requires an authoritative
interpretation of a state statute by a state court before it will render the
statute unconstitutional.40 8 Therefore, the Supreme Court should have
remanded the case to a Virginia court for an authoritative interpretation
of the provision before determining the constitutionality of the statute in
its entirety. 40 9
403. See infra Part IV.A (disputing the Supreme Court's holding that the prima facie evidence
provision rendered the entire statute unconstitutional).
404. See infra Part IV.B (arguing that the plurality reached the conclusion that a state may
constitutionally ban cross burning with the intent to intimidate by erroneous means).
405. See infra Part IV.B (agreeing with Justice Thomas's assertion that cross burning with the
intent to intimidate is conduct and has no expressive value).
406. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1550 (plurality opinion). The prima facie evidence provision
provided that "[a]ny such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to
intimidate a person or group of persons." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1996). See
generally supra note 14 and accompanying text (defining prima facie evidence). The Court
explained, "[A]II we hold is that because of the interpretation of the prima facie evidence
provision given by the jury instruction, the provision makes the statute facially invalid at this
point." Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1552 (plurality opinion).
407. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1552 (plurality opinion).
408. See id. at 1558 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing Justice
Scalia's incredulity as to the plurality's holding absent an authoritative interpretation of the prima
facie evidence provision).
409. While the Supreme Court has not analyzed whether it can sever a part of a state statute
that it deems unconstitutional, it has evaluated this issue with regard to federal statutes. See Field
& Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 697 (1891) (holding that "a general revenue statute should never be
declared inoperative in all its parts because a particular part relating to a distinct subject may be
invalid"). Finding the prima facie evidence provision as severable and striking it as an
unconstitutional part of an otherwise constitutional statute could have been an option for the
Supreme Court to examine instead of declaring that the prima facie evidence provision facially
violated the statute. The United States Supreme Court noted that the Supreme Court of Virginia
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Alternatively, even if the Supreme Court properly analyzed the
statute without an authoritative interpretation of the evidence provision
by the state supreme court, the prima facie evidence provision still does
not render the statute unconstitutional because the provision created an
inference, not a presumption. 410 In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Thomas saw no reason to analyze the statute under First Amendment
grounds but did, however, choose to scrutinize the prima facie evidence
provision.4 11 His explanation of a presumption versus an inference is
useful for determining whether the prima facie provision is
constitutional.412  Clearly, the allowance of a rebuttal renders the
provision constitutional.4 13 An inference does not compel the jury to
reach a particular conclusion and applies to the probative value of the
evidence.414 This means that the defendant can rebut the inference and
the jury is not bound to reach a particular outcome.4 15 As Justice
Thomas wrote, the statute should not be constitutionally problematic
unless no reasonable trier could make the permitted connection.4 16
never reached the issue of whether the provision was severable from the rest of the statute under
Virginia law. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1550 (plurality opinion); see VA. CODE ANN. § 1-17.1 (Michie
1996) (allowing provisions to be severed from statutes).
The provisions of statutes in this Code or the application thereof to any person or
circumstances which are held invalid shall not affect the validity of other statutes,
provisions or applications of this Code which can be given effect without the invalid
provisions or applications. The provisions of all statutes are severable unless (i) the
statute specifically provides that its provisions are not severable; or (ii) it is apparent
that two or more statutes or provisions must operate in accord with one another.
VA. CODE ANN. § 1-17.1. Thus the Supreme Court could have remanded back to the lower court
for a determination of whether the prima facie evidence provision was severable and did not have
to declare the entire statute unconstitutional.
410. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1566-67 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 332-39 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas's distinction between presumptions and
inferences).
411. See supra notes 332-39 and accompanying text (explaining Justice Thomas's
differentiation between inferences and presumptions).
412. See supra notes 332-39 and accompanying text (explaining Justice Thomas's
differentiation between inferences and presumptions).
413. See supra notes 353-55 and accompanying text (stating that the Virginia Supreme Court
never suggested that the jury may ignore rebuttal evidence against the presumption of
intimidation).
414. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1566-67 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 332-39 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas's distinction between presumptions and
inferences).
415. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1566-67 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
416. Id. at 1567 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas noted that the jury instructions in
Black's trial required the jury to find "guilt beyond a reasonable doubt both as to the fact that 'the
defendant burned or caused to bum a cross in a public place' and that 'he did so with the intent to
intimidate any person or persons."' Id. (quoting the jury instructions in Black v. Virginia, 553
S.E.2d 738, 796 (Va. 2001)).
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Because the defendant has the opportunity to present a defense and thus
rebut the presumption of intimidation, the Supreme Court should rely on
the ability of the jury to weigh the credibility of each side's case and
make an informed decision. 417
Moreover, the Court improperly found that the statute was
unconstitutional due to the prima facie evidence provision by relying on
the statute's effect on a very improbable hypothetical class of
persons.4 18 This imaginary class of persons engages in a cross burning
without intent to intimidate, is prosecuted by the state, and fails to
present a defense.419 As Justice Scalia correctly argued, unless there
was no way of interpreting the statute in a constitutional manner, it was
inappropriate to facially invalidate the statute.420  A constitutional way
to interpret the statute in this case did exist; the Court should have noted
the possibility that even if the state convicted a person from this
unlikely group under the Virginia statute, that accused person could
challenge the statute as applied in his particular case. 421 Therefore, the
Court erred by focusing its analysis on this implausible hypothetical
class of persons. 422
Finally, the Court improperly found that the statute was
unconstitutional due to the prima facie evidence provision because,
when determining the constitutionality of the statute, the Court should
have focused on the fundamental prohibition and not the evidentiary
provision.423  Justice Scalia correctly contended that to ascertain the
constitutionality of the statute, the Court should have focused on the
417. See supra notes 353-55 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia justified his approach by
means of the rebuttal available to the defense. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1554 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Justice Souter's assertion that the distortion of jury deliberations
would lead to the suppression of ideas is also unfounded. See supra notes 393-98 and
accompanying text (outlining Justice Souter's contention that the prima facie evidence provision
would distort jury deliberations and result in improper convictions).
418. See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1550 (plurality opinion); see also supra notes 300-02 and
accompanying text (discussing the plurality's analysis of the prima facie evidence provision);
supra notes 366-68 and accompanying text (explaining Justice Scalia's hypothetical class of
persons).
419. See supra note 366 and accompanying text (discussing this theoretical class of persons).
420. See supra note 372 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's finding that facial
invalidation of the Virginia statute was inappropriate in this case).
421. See supra note 366 and accompanying text (discussing this small hypothetical class of
persons); supra note 90 and accompanying text (differentiating facial and as-applied challenges).
422. See supra note 297 and accompanying text (explaining the plurality's concern with the
possibility that a state may convict a defendant if he refuses to set forth a defense against the
intimidation component of the Virginia statute).
423. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1555 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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fundamental prohibition.424  Virginia limited the fundamental
prohibition of the statute to reach only conduct that the Supreme Court
deemed permissible when it declared that the prohibition of cross
burning with the intent to intimidate was constitutional. 425 This basic
prohibition thus did not reach a substantial amount of protected
speech.426 Because the general prohibition did not infringe on a
substantial amount of protected speech, the plurality improperly focused
on the prima facie evidence provision as applied via the jury
instructions in Black's trial to declare the statute facially invalid.427
In short, the plurality wrongly held the Virginia statute facially
unconstitutional based on the prima facie evidence provision.428  The
United States Supreme Court should not have considered the prima
facie evidence provision because the Supreme Court of Virginia did not
set forth an authoritative interpretation of the provision.429 Further, the
prima facie evidence provision created a rebuttable inference that would
allow a jury to use its judgment in determining whether the accused
intended to intimidate. 430  The United States Supreme Court also
wrongly emphasized an implausible hypothetical class of persons who
may be wrongly convicted under the statute.431 Finally, the Supreme
Court wrongly concentrated on the evidentiary provision in its analysis
of the Virginia statute rather than focusing on the specific prohibition
that it deemed constitutional-cross burning with the intent to
intimidate. 432
424. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra note 409 and
accompanying text (suggesting that the Supreme Court should have considered severing the
prima facie evidence provision and should not have declared the entire statute facially
unconstitutional).
425. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1555 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
426. Id. at 1555 n.2 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally supra
Part II.C.2 (discussing the overbreadth doctrine and facial challenges thereto).
427. See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1551-52 (plurality opinion).
428. See supra notes 406-28 and accompanying text (explaining why the plurality incorrectly
held the Virginia statute to be facially unconstitutional because of its prima facie evidence
provision).
429. See supra notes 406-09 and accompanying text (explaining why the plurality incorrectly
concluded that the statute was invalid and suggesting that a remand to a lower court for further
interpretation was appropriate).
430. See supra notes 410-17 and accompanying text (contending that because the prima facie
evidence provision created an inference and not a presumption, the court should permit the jury to
use its judgment in weighing all the evidence).
431. See supra notes 418-21 and accompanying text (arguing that the plurality impermissibly
focused on a hypothetical class of persons who could facially challenge the Virginia law).
432. See supra notes 423-27 and accompanying text (claiming that in assessing the statute's
facial validity, the plurality should have focused on the general prohibition in the statute rather
than the prima facie evidence provision).
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B. The Court Correctly Concluded That a State May Ban Cross
Burning with the Intent To Intimidate, but Reached This
Conclusion for the Wrong Reasons
The plurality correctly held that a state may ban cross burning with
the intent to intimidate. 433 While the Court reached the appropriate
result-that the statute's prohibition did not violate the First
Amendment-it incorrectly used the R.A.V. framework to reach this
conclusion.434 Its analysis under R.A. V. and the exceptions therein was
inappropriate because the Virginia statute in Virginia v. Black regulated
non-expressive conduct only and thus did not implicate the analysis of
content-based restrictions. 435 Instead, the Virginia cross burning statute
and others like it may ban cross burning with the intent to intimidate
without violating the First Amendment because such statutes do not
regulate speech; they regulate non-expressive conduct. 436
The Virginia statute, along with other cross burning statutes similarly
written, only regulated non-expressive conduct.437 Justice Thomas did
not analyze the R.A.V. framework in his dissenting opinion because he
argued that the statute did not regulate any expressive conduct. 438
Justice Thomas rightly advocated that the Virginia legislature had
removed all expressive components when it added the intention
clause. 439 Justice Thomas viewed this effort by the legislature as
433. See Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1549 (2003) (plurality opinion). "Virginia's
statute does not run afoul of the First Amendment insofar as it bans cross burning with intent to
intimidate." Id. (plurality opinion).
434. See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1563 (Thomas, J., dissenting); supra Part II.H (discussing the
Court's holding in R.A.V. and the confusing precedent it set); supra notes 288-93 (describing the
plurality's use of the R.A.V. exception).
435. See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1563 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see supra Part II.H (discussing the
Court's holding in R.A.V. and the confusing precedent it set); supra notes 288-93 (describing the
plurality's use of the R.A. V. exception).
436. See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1563 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
437. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1996) (delineating statutory intent); infra note
438 (quoting Justice Thomas on the non-expressive nature of the statute).
438. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1563 (Thomas, J., dissenting). "In my view, whatever expressive
value cross burning has, the legislature simply wrote it out by banning only intimidating conduct
undertaken by a particular means." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
439. See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1563 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Eric J. Grannis, Note,
Fighting Words and Fighting Freestyle: The Constitutionality of Penalty Enhancement for Bias
Crimes, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 178, 189-191 (1993) (arguing that courts incorrectly have
distinguished between motive and intent in holding that punishing motive was equivalent to
punishing thought). Grannis sets forth the idea that motive and intent are the same thing and,
therefore, creating penalty-enhancing statutes is not unconstitutional. Grannis, supra, at 189-91;
see Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 490 (1993) (finding that the penalty-enhancing
provision of a Wisconsin statute did not violate the defendant's First Amendment rights);
Dobbins v. State, 605 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that the statute did not
punish opinion, but rather punished acts of discrimination).
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significant because of the segregation laws in place at the time the
Virginia statute was enacted.440 Justice Thomas further concluded that
to rationalize the cross burning law with the laws of segregation in place
at the time, one must conclude that Virginia's interest must have been
penalizing especially brutal conduct. 441 Other courts similarly have
found that cross burning statutes do not regulate expressive conduct.
4 2
While burning a cross on one's own private property as a way of
expressing oneself might be offensive, clearly the Virginia statute
would not allow for conviction for this activity. 443 In such a scenario,
there is no element of intimidation, and the conduct is purely
expressive. 444 However, when an individual sets afire a cross in a
neighbor's yard to scare or intimidate that person, the Virginia statute
would apply because the element of intimidation would exist.445 The
element of intimidation removes all expression from the cross burning
440. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1566 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas explained, "It strains
credulity to suggest that a state legislature that adopted a litany of segregationist laws self-
contradictorily intended to squelch the segregationist message." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
441. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1566 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas explained:
Even for segregationists, violent and terroristic conduct, the Siamese twin of cross
burning, was intolerable. The ban on cross burning with intent to intimidate
demonstrates that even segregationists understood the difference between intimidating
and terroristic conduct and racist expression. It is simply beyond belief that, in passing
the statute now under review, the Virginia legislature was concerned with anything but
penalizing conduct it must have viewed as particularly vicious.
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
442. E.g., United States v. Stewart, 65 F.3d 918, 928 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that convicting
defendants of burning a cross was not in violation of the First Amendment because the defendants
were engaging in an activity); see supra note 217 (discussing cases in which cross burning
statutes were upheld). For example, a California court found that the California cross burning
statute regulated only malicious cross burning, which implicated the true threats and fighting
words doctrines. See In re Steven S. v. People, 25 Cal. App. 4th 598, 607 (Ct. App. 1994)
(finding that the fighting words and true threats doctrines applied to the California cross burning
statute). A Florida court similarly found that its cross burning statute did not infringe upon
expressive conduct because the cross burning prohibited fell into the true threats and fighting
words doctrines of unprotected speech. State v. T.B.D., 656 So. 2d 479, 480-81 (Fla. 1995)
(finding that the fighting words and true threats doctrines applied to a similar Florida cross
burning statute). See generally supra Part I.D.2-3 (discussing the true threats and fighting words
doctrines).
443. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1542 (plurality opinion). This was the setting for Barry Black's cross
burning. Id.; see supra notes 234-41 and accompanying text (laying out the facts for Barry
Black's conviction under the Virginia statute).
444. See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1552 (plurality opinion) (finding that the jury instructions
regarding the prima facie evidence provision were erroneous in Barry Black's case and
overturning his conviction).
445. See id. at 1543 (plurality opinion) (depicting the emotions of a family after someone
burned a cross in the family's yard as a threat).
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and unambiguously represents a criminal act not unlike sexual
assault. 446
While the plurality claimed that the Virginia prohibition was
constitutional because the prohibition fit into the particularly virulent
exception under R.A. V., the plurality did not look to the wording of the
statute.447  In fact, the plurality called the cross burning a particularly
virulent form of intimidation, not speech.448 Further, the statute does
not prohibit all cross burnings. 449 It prohibits those only that are done
with the intent to intimidate.450  This added element of intent removes
the expressive component that may exist in cross burning, and therefore
the statute is drawn in a sufficiently narrow manner to regulate only
conduct. 451
In his partial concurrence and partial dissent, Justice Souter
erroneously declared that the Virginia statute was a content-based
statute that did not fall within one of the R.A.V. exceptions. 452 He
claimed that prohibiting cross burning with the intent to intimidate
selects a symbol with a particular content.453 However, the statute
prohibited the act of burning a cross with the intent to intimidate, not
the act of cross burning with no qualifying objective.454 Because the
statute did not infringe upon protected speech, the Court correctly
declared that its basic prohibition was constitutional.455
446. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-427 (Michie 1996) (stating the intimidation requirement in a
statute); cf id. § 18.2-61(A)(i) (criminalizing sexual intercourse "against the complaining
witness's will, by force, threat or intimidation of or against the complaining witness or another
person").
447. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1549 (plurality opinion).
448. Id. (plurality opinion).
449. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423.01 (setting forth Virginia's cross burning statute at issue
in Black); see supra notes 228-46 and accompanying text (discussing the Virginia statute as
applied in Black's, Elliott's, and O'Mara's cases).
450. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423; see supra notes 228-46 and accompanying text (discussing
the Virginia statute as applied in Black's, Elliott's, and O'Mara's cases).
451. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (providing the intent element).
452. See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1559 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Souter unambiguously declared, "I disagree that any exception should save Virginia's law
from unconstitutionality under the holding in R.A.V. or any acceptable variation of it." Id.
(Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
453. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This idea could be supported
by Texas v. Johnson, in which the Court held that although one might find flag burning offensive
or intimidating, its offensiveness is not enough to render it unconstitutional under the First
Amendment. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 400 (1989); see supra notes 172-78 and
accompanying text (stating the Court's holding and rationale in Texas v. Johnson).
454. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (stating the limitations in the law); see supra notes 228-46
and accompanying text (discussing the Virginia statute as applied in Black's, Elliott's, and
O'Mara's cases).
455. See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1549 (plurality opinion).
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In short, the Supreme Court correctly concluded that a state may ban
cross burning with the intent to intimidate. 456  However, the Supreme
Court incorrectly applied the R.A.V. framework in so holding because
the Virginia statute did not implicate a First Amendment analysis. 4
5 7
The Virginia statute regulated pure conduct with no expressive
component. 458 Thus the Virginia statute would not prohibit all cross
burnings and would not allow the Commonwealth to punish those
persons who burn a cross for purely expressive reasons. 4
59
V. IMPACT
The most important effect of Virginia v. Black is the Court's
affirmation of a state's ability to ban cross burning with the intent to
intimidate.460 This means that a state can prohibit the burning of a cross
with the intent to intimidate without violating the First Amendment.4 6 1
However, given the fragmented nature of the opinion and the widely
varying opinions of the Justices, many believe that the case did not
leave clear precedent for courts regarding the constitutionality of similar
statutes. 46 2  This Part therefore first discusses the case's uncertain
impact on First Amendment jurisprudence.463 Then, this Part discusses
the public perception of the case. 46 4
456. See id. (plurality opinion).
457. See id. 1563 (Thomas, J., dissenting); supra notes 281-93 and accompanying text
(describing the plurality's use of the R.A.V. exception).
458. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (delineating statutory intent); supra text accompanying
note 319 (noting Justice Thomas's opinion on the non-expressive nature of the statute).
459. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1542 (plurality opinion).
460. See id. (plurality opinion); see also supra Part III.D.1 (detailing the plurality's reasoning
that a ban on cross burning with the intent to intimidate does not violate the First Amendment).
461. See supra Part III.D.1 (discussing the plurality's conclusion that a ban on cross burning
with the intent to intimidate may not violate the First Amendment). But see infra notes 490-94
and accompanying text (describing the failed Utah bill seeking to make cross burning a separate
crime from existing hate crimes statutes in the state).
462. See Editorial, A Compromise on Cross Burning, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 10, 2003,
at 20A, available at 2003 WL 18341508. The editorial noted:
[Justice O'Connor's] decision failed to stand firmly either for the freedom of
individuals to speak symbolically through the burning of a cross, or for the right of the
state to end this noxious practice .... It was a fair compromise that does some
damage to free speech jurisprudence, but not an excessive amount.
Id.
463. See infra Part V.A (examining the case's potential effects on First Amendment
jurisprudence).
464. See infra Part V.B (discussing public perception of this case).
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A. Impact on First Amendment Jurisprudence
In Virginia v. Black, the Justices of the Supreme Court impacted
three areas of First Amendment jurisprudence: (1) symbolic speech, (2)
overbreadth doctrine, and (3) content-based regulations.465  In prior
cases, the Supreme Court has protected many different forms of
symbolic speech.466 However, the Court always has provided that to
determine the level of protection afforded symbolic speech, it must
examine the scrutinized conduct in the context in which the conduct
occurs.467 The result in Virginia v. Black appears to uphold this idea of
protection with regard to the context in which the conduct occurs:
burning a cross on one's private property for expressive purposes will
remain protected under the First Amendment, whereas burning a cross
on a neighbor's lawn to scare him will not be protected, and states will
be able to regulate such activity.468 Taking the conduct in the context in
which it occurs, burning a cross for expression generally will not
intimidate an individual, unlike burning a cross in a neighbor's yard
without permission.469 However, given the fragmented nature of the
opinion and the widely varying opinions of the Justices, it is possible
that this view of symbolic speech and the level of protections afforded it
by the Constitution could change. 470
Virginia v. Black, through the opinion of Justice Scalia, also impacted
the First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth.47 1  Justice Scalia
explained that the Court's first duty in a constitutional challenge based
on the overbreadth doctrine is to determine whether the regulation
465. See generally Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003).
466. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding flag burning to be protected
symbolic speech). See generally supra Part M.E (discussing the Court's analysis of symbolic
speech).
467. See supra Part II.E (discussing the Court's analysis of symbolic speech).
468. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1549 (plurality opinion). It follows from this that an absolute ban on
cross burning would be invalid. See id. (plurality opinion).
469. See supra notes 438-41 (arguing that the Virginia legislature omitted the regulation of
any expressive component under its cross burning statute when it added "with intent to
intimidate" and further that the Virginia statute would not allow for the prosecution of cross
burning for expressive purposes that contain no element of intimidation).
470. See James Weinstein, Hate Speech, Viewpoint Neutrality, and the American Concept of
Democracy, in THE BOUNDARIES OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION & ORDER IN AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 151-52 (Thomas R. Hensley ed., 2001). Weinstein examines the Canadian ban on
hate speech and declares that it certainly would be held unconstitutional in the United States
because of an explicit viewpoint content-based discrimination. Id. He uses the Court's analysis
in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul to analyze the Canadian statute. Id.
471. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1552 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.47 2
However, he cautioned against the way in which the Supreme Court of
Virginia used the overbreadth doctrine because the Virginia court
focused on an evidentiary statute rather than the basic prohibition. 4
73
Black created a broader usage of the overbreadth doctrine in that courts
now may consider evidentiary provisions in addition to the supposed
speech being suppressed in the statute when determining whether the
statute complies with First Amendment guarantees. 474  In future cases,
the United States Supreme Court may take a more cautious approach in
its application of this doctrine and make certain that it focuses on the
likelihood of conviction when examining an evidentiary provision, not
the likelihood of arrest and prosecution.475
Finally, Virginia v. Black also may affect First Amendment analysis
and the distinction between content-based statutes and content-neutral
statutes.476  This distinction of content is a fundamental determination
in First Amendment doctrine, albeit a complex one. 477 However, the
plurality did not analyze whether the statute was content-based or
content-neutral. 478 The Justices did not discuss this distinction between
content-based and content-neutral statutes in the context of the Virginia
statute because they deemed cross burning an activity with a specific
472. See supra note 361 and accompanying text (explaining Justice Scalia's take on the
overbreadth doctrine); see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (holding that
for a successful overbreadth challenge, the statute's overbreadth must be both real and
substantial). See generally supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the overbreadth doctrine and facial
challenges thereto).
473. See supra note 357 and accompanying text (explaining Justice Scalia's analysis that the
Virginia court's use of the overbreadth doctrine was inappropriate).
474. See supra notes 361-68 and accompanying text (outlining Justice Scalia's criticism of
the plurality's overbreadth analysis).
475. See supra note 357 and accompanying text (explaining Justice Scalia's analysis that the
Court had never before found the threat of arrest and prosecution to be enough to render a statute
overbroad); see also supra Part II.C.2 (discussing overbreadth analysis as a means by which the
Court has analyzed First Amendment challenges). But see N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 344
F.3d 418, 432-33 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that the presumption in a campaign finance law
rendered the statute overbroad).
476. See generally Part II.C. 1 (explaining the differences between content-based and content-
neutral statutes and the differences in the way the Court interprets the two types of statutes).
477. See Jacobs, supra note 82, at 622 (stating that the differences between content-based,
content-neutral, and viewpoint-based statutes are confusing and are often confused).
478. See supra note 292 and accompanying text (noting the Court's conclusion without
analysis that the statute was content-based).
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message of hatred.479 Perhaps this shows a new direction for courts in
First Amendment analysis. 480
B. Public Perception
The decision additionally left the public confused as to what the
case's holding meant.4 81 The media seemed to emphasize the Court's
upholding of the basic prohibition without realizing that the Court's
final holding deemed the Virginia statute facially unconstitutional. 482
479. See supra note 292 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's conclusion that the
statute was content-based and its lack of extensive analysis).
480. See Church of the Am. Knights of the KKK v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 211 (2d Cir. 2004)
(finding a New York "anti-mask" statute constitutional because it regulated the conduct of
wearing a mask, not the expression behind the mask). At trial, the New York court did not
employ a content-based analysis of the statute. Id. at 203-211. But see Sheehan v. Gregoire, 272
F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1145-47 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (analyzing a statute via content-based and
content-neutral distinctions). The district court distinguished the holding in Virginia v. Black in
Sheehan v. Gregoire and held that not all forms of intimidating speech constitute a threat. Id. at
1143. In Black, the Supreme Court relied on the fact that cross burning has had a "long and
pernicious history as a signal of impending violence" and therefore held that it could ban cross
burning. Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1549 (2003) (plurality opinion). However, Sheehan
dealt with the prohibition of the intentionally intimidating distribution of phone numbers and
addresses of a "law enforcement-related, corrections officer-related, or court-related employee or
volunteer." Sheehan, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1139. The district court held that since the speech at
issue did not have a similar history of impending violence, there was no support for the
defendants' argument that "subjective intent alone transforms such pure speech into a true threat"
and therefore the statute at issue was fundamentally different from the prohibition in Virginia v.
Black. Id. at 1142.
481. One commentator argues that the Court should have made a distinction between public
and private property. See The Cross-burning Decision: This Wasn't Supposed To Happen Here,
ISSUES & VIEWS, Apr. 21, 2003, http://www.issues-views.comindex.php/sect/21000/
article/21059. This commentator asserts that the First Amendment is rooted in the protection of
property and that the cases of Elliott and O'Mara clearly involved criminal trespass. Id.
However, in Black's case, the defendant was on private property. Id. This commentator sees
their property violations as something the Court missed. Id.
482. See David Tell, Soon To Be a Major New York Times Correction: A New York Times
Editorial Gets a Supreme Court Decision Exactly Wrong, THE DAILY STANDARD, Apr. 10, 2003,
available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/ContentlPublic/Articles/000/000/002/520igsbz.asp
(last visited June 15, 2004). Tell noted that the leading line of the New York Times story the day
following the Court decision read: "The Supreme Court upheld a Virginia statute yesterday that
makes it illegal for Ku Klux Klansmen and others to burn crosses." Id. (quoting Editorial, A
Decision on Cross Burning, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2003, at A22). However, other newspapers got
the holding correct and proceeded to explain how the statute could pass constitutional muster.
See Court Hit the Mark on Cross-burning Ban; If the Act Is Meant To Intimidate or Incite
Violence, It Is Not Protected Expression, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 13, 2003, at 2H,
available at 2003 WL 15639118. This Texas newspaper reported that "the key is to write it in
such a way that it becomes a felony to burn a cross with the intent of intimidating any person or
group." Id. Although Texas does not have a cross burning law, the article noted that the federal
government punishes similar activities under federal law. Id.; see supra note 183 and
accompanying text (describing the statute enacted by the federal government to punish cross
burners).
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Some reporters praised Justice O'Connor's opinion for being balanced
and fair.483 Some advocates also noted the importance of this decision
to First Amendment jurisprudence. 484
However, many people now contrast the apparently different result in
Black from that in R.A. V.v. St. Paul.485 Both statutes had the same
basic prohibition, although each was worded quite differently.486 Some
commentators have claimed that the decision in Virginia v. Black is a
retreat from R.A. V.487  Some fear that this ruling will lead to over-
zealous legislation regulating other controversial symbols such as
swastikas and flag burning. 488
483. See, e.g., Editorial, A Decision on Cross Burning, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2003, at A22
(stating that the Court's opinion "sounds a welcome note of caution"), available at LEXIS, News
Library, The New York Times File.
484. The National Director of the Anti-Defamation League, Abraham H. Foxman, issued the
following statement following the Court's decision:
The burning cross is a symbol of hate, one that is inextricably linked to this
nation's racist and segregationist past. In upholding Virginia's statute, the Supreme
Court rightfully recognizes that the government has the clear power to outlaw the use
of this particularly hateful symbol when the intent is to intimidate or threaten another
person. Today's decision confirms what we have argued repeatedly-that threats are
not constitutionally protected free speech. A burning cross that is erected with the
intent to intimidate or instill fear does not deserve the same protection as other
expressions of speech.
Cross-burning statutes do not necessarily run afoul of the First Amendment, as
long as they are carefully drafted to outlaw only criminal acts and not unpopular
political ideas. We believe that the Virginia statute does not attempt to criminalize
racial hatred. It criminalizes the use of a burning cross as a means of intimidation.
Press Release, Anti-Defamation League, ADL Welcomes Supreme Court Decision Upholding
Virginia State Ban on Cross Burning (Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://adl.org/PresRele/
CvlRt_32/4249_33.htm (last visited May 10, 2004).
485. One reporter wrote that "it seems clear that the R.A.V. decision was a narrow ruling by
which the court did not mean that cross burning could not be treated as a crime." Linda
Greenhouse, Justices Allow Bans on Cross Burnings Intended as Threats, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8,
2003, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File.
486. See supra notes 11, 197 and accompanying text (highlighting the relevant provisions of
the Virginia statute in Virginia v. Black and the St. Paul ordinance in R.A.V.). Both statutes
prohibited cross burning with intent to intimidate, although the St. Paul ordinance included other
forms of harassment and did not include a prima facie provision. Id.
487. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Justices Uphold Cross-burning Ban, THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 8, 2003, at 4, available at LEXIS, News Library, The Legal Intelligencer
File.
488. Id. The author quotes Joshua Wheeler, a lawyer at the Thomas Jefferson Center for the
Protection of Free Expression in Charlottesville, Virginia: "'Our concern is how much the
language in the decision would lend itself to being used in other contexts .... Even if the court
intended its ruling to be limited to cross burning, the potential always exists for legislators to go
beyond that."' Id. But see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423.01 (Michie 1996) (providing expressly
for the punishment of "any person, who, with the intent of intimidating any person or group of
persons, burns an object on the private property of another without permission").
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After Black, other states proposed legislation to outlaw cross burning
with the intent to intimidate.489  For instance, fifth-graders in a Utah
school saw the problem posed by cross burning and persuaded a
representative to sponsor a bill outlawing cross burning in their state.490
This bill would have made it a third degree felony to burn a cross on
public property with the intent to intimidate. 491 Those arguing against
the bill maintained that the government could prosecute cross burners
under already-existing laws.492 Proponents of the bill argued that cross
burning is a more serious offense than those crimes under which the
state currently could prosecute a cross burner.493 Unfortunately for
these fifth-graders, the Utah bill did not pass the state House, and the
legislature did not enact the bill.494 However, the federal government
can continue to prosecute individuals for cross burning and the effects
thereof under federal law.495
VI. CONCLUSION
In Virginia v. Black, the Supreme Court established the important
principle that legislatures may prohibit cross burning with the intent to
intimidate. However, the Court ultimately held the Virginia law
489. See H.B. 1074, 92d Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2003) (summarizing Missouri's
proposed cross burning statute), available at http://www.house.state.mo.us/bills041/bilsum/intro/
sHB1074I.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004). This bill proposes legislation that would make it a
crime to burn a cross with the intent to intimidate any person. Id.
490. Main Decker, Fifth-graders, Legislator's Bill Would Ban Burning Crosses To
Intimidate, THE SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 2, 2004, at B2, available at 2003 WL 57839650. One of
the students commented, "'We thought that it wasn't fair .... I think it's bad because it scares a
lot of people. It hurts and scares them, and people don't like being scared."' Id.
491. Id.
492. Jennifer Dobner, Measure on Cross Burning Defeated, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Feb.
13, 2004, at A2 (quoting State Representative LaVar Christensen as stating that while "no one
sanctions cross burning .... the crime can already be prosecuted as a third-degree felony under
other sections of Utah law"), available at 2004 WL 67074178.
493. Id. Another representative noted that cross burning is "'a message crime"' and "'[i]f we
had a specific law like (HB246) passed or an enforceable hate crimes law,"' the state could
address message crimes such as cross burning. Id. He added that the legislature could address
this crime, which he noted was "more serious than a trespass, or a vandalism or an arson."' Id.
494. Id. The vote was 51-22 and mostly divided on party lines, with Republicans voting for
the bill and Democrats voting against the bill. Id.; see also Utah State Legislature, H.B. 246:
Prohibition of Cross Burning on Property (providing the language of the failed Utah bill),
available at http://www.le.state.ut.us/-2004/bills/hbillint/hb0246.htm (last visited June 15, 2004).
495. See Dep't of Justice, Macomb, Illinois Man Sentenced for Cross Burning Targeting
Interracial Couple, REG. INTELLIGENCE DATABASE, Feb. 9, 2004, available at 2004 WL 250178
(discussing the prosecution of bias-induced crimes under federal law). "Since 2001, the [Civil
Rights] Division has prosecuted 35 cases, charging 50 defendants involved in cross burnings."
Id. See generally supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing the federal statute under
which the government has convicted cross burners).
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unconstitutional, thus showing that the Supreme Court remains reluctant
to uphold legislation restricting expression of any kind. Moreover, the
Court did not definitively determine how a statute may constitutionally
prohibit controversial conduct. Therefore, it is highly likely that the
Supreme Court will face once again a constitutional challenge to a
statute that regulates controversial conduct.
